정책 이슈

Trump's remarks on the 2nd are a typical pressure tactic, pushing unilateral announcements beyond the negotiated text back into tariff leverage. The political logic of the demand is clear, but its contractual and commercial validity is weak. What Korea needs to do now is not to emotionally reject or hastily sign, but to rewrite the price, volume, and risk allocation using the already agreed-upon 'commercial reasonableness' clause as a shield. Alaska LNG itself has remained a project on paper for decades for a reason, and that reason has not yet disappeared.

On September 30, the White House announced that Korea's $200 billion energy investment package in the U.S. would include a Texas gas-fired combined cycle power plant, eight large nuclear power plants, and Alaska LNG. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick specifically mentioned Alaska's share as over $50 billion. The Korean government immediately drew a line. Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy Kim Jung-kwan stated that the content in the agreement document was three sentences long, and that reviews would only commence upon confirmation of commercial reasonableness. He also said that he strongly objected to Lutnick, stating that the U.S. announcement went beyond the agreement. President Lee Jae-myung also stated that practical reviews would proceed on the premise that commercial viability is confirmed and domestic legal procedures are met. The wording in the joint fact sheet is closer to 'commence working, subject to commercial reasonableness.' It is not a confirmed investment.

Two days later, Trump filled that gap not by bridging it, but with pressure. “If they don’t want it, that’s fine. We’ll just charge more.” “Tell them if they don’t sign soon, we’ll double it.” He didn't specify what would be doubled, but in context, it's natural to interpret it as referring to the tariffs on the U.S., which were lowered from 25% to 15% last year, or the amount claimed within that package. At the same time, the White House confirmed that this announcement was 'historic' and that Alaskans were looking forward to its construction and completion. This is a scene where political schedules and state politics have overtaken commercial judgment.

So, is the demand reasonable? Not according to the usual practice of alliance management. Writing conditions into an agreement, and then publicly threatening penalties when the other party agrees to those conditions, undermines the very principles of negotiation. What Korea promised last year in exchange for tariff reductions was a certain amount of investment in the US and LNG purchases, not an unconditional investment in a specific pipeline whose commercial viability had not been confirmed. The maximum total investment and annual remittance limits are already on the negotiating table. Within that framework, it is the investor's right to choose which projects to pursue.

However, the logic of power is at play. For Trump, Alaska LNG is a symbol of the energy export narrative and Alaskan politics. Several presidents since the Carter administration have promised the commercialization of North Slope gas, only to be stopped repeatedly by costs and demand. If Asian buyers like Korea and Japan cannot be attracted, the pipeline will be delayed again. That's why he tries to subordinate commercial review to the political agenda with the phrase, 'If you don't sign, you'll get more.' This is consistent as a negotiation strategy, but it is not a contract condition that Korea should accept. If the standard of reasonableness is 'Does the US president want it?', then all demands become reasonable. If it is 'Is it a recoverable investment?', then this demand still lacks sufficient basis.

The business viability is even more sobering. The project structure seems simple. Gas from the Arctic North Slope is sent about 1,300 km via pipeline to Nikiski in the south, and a liquefaction facility with an annual capacity of 20 million tons is built to export to Asia. The total project cost proposed by the developer, Glenfarne, is $44.5 billion to $54.5 billion. The number the US initially presented to Korea was $67 billion, which later came down to $54 billion and then the low $50 billion range. This means the amount itself is a negotiating point.

Unit cost is at the heart of the problem. This scale corresponds to approximately $2.2 billion to $2.7 billion per million tons of annual production capacity. This is more than double the average construction cost of around $1 billion per million tons for US Gulf Coast LNG projects approved since 2022. The costs are divided into three main categories: $13.2 billion to $16.9 billion for pipelines, $7.7 billion to $9.2 billion for northern gas processing facilities, and $23.6 billion to $28.4 billion for the Nikiski liquefaction and shipping facilities. The Gulf Coast only needs to add liquefaction facilities on top of the existing shale gas pipeline network. Alaska, however, has to build entirely new gas field processing, a 1,300 km pipeline over permafrost, and a liquefaction terminal. The construction season is short, labor and logistics are expensive, and construction delays immediately translate into interest costs. This is the background for why Minister Kim Jung-kwan viewed this project as high-risk last year and stated that even the US understands its lack of commercial viability.

The demand side is also not yet closed. Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and TotalEnergies have expressed non-binding purchase intentions for 13 million tons per year. This is far from the binding long-term sales contracts needed for financial procurement. Glenfarne had set the Final Investment Decision (FID) for the pipeline for 2026, the FID for export facilities for 2027, and initial exports for 2031, but the schedule has already been pushed back once due to not meeting purchase contract targets. The ownership structure is also 75% Glenfarne and 25% Alaska State. There is a precedent where majors like ExxonMobil, BP, and ConocoPhillips previously pursued this route but then abandoned it. This is not because of a lack of resources, but because the cost of bringing those resources to market erodes the selling price.

It's not without its advantages. The shipping route from Nikiski to Korea and Japan is shorter than departing from the Gulf and passing through Panama. It's true that freight costs and transportation risks are reduced. There's also the supply chain value of adding North America as another source, in addition to the Middle East, Australia, and Russia. The conditions proposed by the U.S. – economically viable long-term purchase agreements, priority access for Korea, reduced tariffs on steel and equipment, and participation of Korean companies in construction – can compensate for some of the investment recovery through other channels. If the profit and loss of investments in the U.S. are settled in an umbrella-like manner rather than project by project, a structure where the more profitable Texas gas combined cycle power plant (government estimated $22.3 billion investment, 1.9-2.0 times recovery over 20 years) partially covers Alaska's deficit is also possible. However, that's not proof that Alaska is self-sustaining, but rather closer to meaning that the profits from other businesses are subsidizing a political project. If Korea's domestic LNG demand stagnates or decreases due to changes in industrial and demographic structure, the long-term purchase obligation becomes a contract to bear expensive gas.

It's appropriate to divide the response into three layers.

First, re-establish the wording. The entirety of the agreement is the initiation of a review conditioned on commercial rationality and domestic legal procedures. This sentence must be fixed as the standard for parliamentary reports, investment reviews, and external explanations. Trump's public statements are political messages, not contract amendments. The minimum defense is for Minister Kim to document the objections he has already made through official channels, so that reinterpretations of 'agreement' are not repeated later.

Second, convert the numbers into conditions. Instead of completely blocking participation, Korea sets the price of participation. The investment cap should not be the $50 billion mentioned by the US, but rather a figure calculated backward from Korea's affordable annual remittance limit and a total of $200 billion. Preconditions must include the equity ratio, minimum profit guarantee, who bears cost overruns, penalties for construction delays, a cap on long-term purchase prices (reflecting freight savings compared to Gulf FOB), and a mandatory percentage of Korean equipment and construction volume. Korea can simply adopt the financial practice of not committing funds to FID until binding purchase agreements cover a significant portion of the facility's capacity. If the US genuinely lowers costs through federal credit guarantees or tax credits, that effect should be reflected in the price; if not, the investment scale should be reduced, or participation should shift from equity to purchasing and equipment supply.

Third, accept the tariff threat as a whole package. If 'double' means the restoration of a 15% tariff, it's not just an issue with the Alaska project, but a renegotiation of the entire tariff agreement from last year. Since automobiles, parts, and electronics are already under the 15% regime, it is more advantageous for Korea to maintain negotiating power by bundling the Texas power plant, nuclear power, equipment tariffs, and LNG purchases together, rather than rejecting Alaska in isolation. A structure where Korean capital simultaneously takes on 8 nuclear power plants (estimated at about $120 billion) and Alaska effectively nullifies the total cap. The correct order is to prioritize power generation projects with visible profits and technological participation, leaving Alaska as an option.

The tone of public response is also important. If we only push the narrative that 'the US is forcing us,' it becomes material for Trump's domestic politics. The narrative that 'the signed conditions are for commercial viability, and we will expedite that review' aligns with the text and also eases the pressure. While the review results should not be predetermined, the review criteria should be disclosed in advance: unit investment cost, binding sales contract ratio, cost overrun sharing, and competitiveness of domestic import prices. If these four are not met, it is rational for the investment scale to be reduced to near zero.

While Trump's demand is understood as a political bill to revive the Alaska project, there is no reason for Korea to accept it as is, given the agreement's wording and the project's cost. Alaska LNG has the real advantage of transportation distance, but there is no evidence yet that this advantage offsets the excess costs of pipelines and liquefaction facilities. Korea's response is not a rejection but a conditional delay. Money will not be invested until commercial viability is confirmed by numbers, and even if confirmed, it will only be invested under a structure where risks and equipment shares return to Korea. If this line is not maintained, tariffs may be temporarily lowered, but expensive gas and unrecovered investments will remain for longer.