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The wisdom the current government should learn from 'Jeonbun 6-deungbeop and Yeonbun 9-deungbeop'

Policies do not succeed with good intentions alone. Measures to curb housing prices raise jeonse and monthly rents, and while raising taxes may seem to increase tax revenue, people change their buying and investment behaviors, leading to completely different results. Every policy has side effects and ripple effects. So what should the government do? I want to find the answer in King Sejong's tax reform 600 years ago.

The land tax in the early Joseon Dynasty followed the Dapheom-sonsilbeop, where officials directly investigated the crop yield of fields to determine the tax amount. The intention to collect more during abundant harvests and less during poor harvests was rational. However, there were too many fields to investigate, and above all, the subjective judgment of the officials evaluating the crop yield determined the tax amount. For the people, how officials viewed their fields became as important as farming well. A system intended to care for the people ended up tying them to the discretion of officials.

King Sejong sought to reduce this discretion and impose taxes based on objective criteria. The alternative was the Gongbeop (tribute law). In 1430, King Sejong sought opinions on the Gongbeop not only from officials but also from ordinary citizens. Of the 172,806 participants, 98,657 approved, and 74,149 opposed. With approximately 57% in favor, it was a number that could have been implemented by today's majority rule.

King Sejong looked at the distribution behind the numbers. In Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do, there were 65,864 in favor and 664 opposed, but in Hamgil-do and Pyeongan-do, there were 1,410 in favor and 35,912 opposed. The same system had completely opposite meanings depending on the region. A policy that is good on a national average is not necessarily good for all regions. King Sejong stopped there.

In 1436, he established the Jeonje Sangjeongso to professionally research the tax system, and in 1437, he attempted to implement the Sangjeong Gongbeop nationwide. However, when local officials and the Saganwon strongly opposed, King Sejong backed down again. He valued the content of the opposing opinions more heavily than the prestige of a decision already made.

The method has changed. In 1438, it was first implemented in Gyeongsang-do and Jeolla-do, and the following year it was expanded to Chungcheong-do. In today's terms, it was a pilot program. When it was actually implemented, problems that were not visible on paper, such as a greater tax burden than expected, emerged, and the system was revised each time. It was not until 1444 that the basic framework of the Jeonbun Yukdeungbeop (Six-Grade Land Tax System) and Yeonbun Gudeungbeop (Nine-Grade Crop Yield System) was finalized.

The Jeonbun Yukdeungbeop divided land fertility into six grades, and the Yeonbun Gudeungbeop divided annual crop yields into nine grades, collecting 20 du per gyeol in the best harvest year and 4 du in the worst famine year. This system incorporated two realities: that the productivity of each piece of land differs, and that conditions vary from year to year. This system was not perfect either. Human judgment was still needed to determine crop yields, and land surveying had to follow, so nationwide implementation was not completed until 1489 during King Seongjong's reign. Therefore, the core of this reform lies not in a 'successful system' but in the process of creating the system.

Real estate is an area where policy experiments are particularly difficult. If property taxes are changed, the behavior of owners changes; if loans are tightened, the timing and ability to purchase change; and if the sales market is suppressed, demand shifts to monthly and yearly rentals. Supply measures take several years to bear fruit.

The current government's position is to stabilize the market by combining regulations, supply, and taxation. As of September 2026, the market is not simple; apartment prices in some areas like Gangnam and Seocho have fallen, but Seoul as a whole continues its long-term upward trend. It is too early to definitively declare the entire policy a success or failure. However, one can ask: were the secondary and tertiary effects sufficiently verified before implementation?

The property tax debate is similar. Proponents of strengthening argue for curbing excessive ownership and increasing tax equity, while those advocating caution worry about rent pass-through, the burden on retirees, and the preference for 'one good property.' Decisions should not be made by listening to only one side's logic. We need to move beyond debating whether the objective is right and actually confirm what is happening.

The rise in jeonse and monthly rent should also be analyzed by separating the causes. This is because supply and move-in volume, interest rates, loan regulations, the lease system, and changes in the number of households all act simultaneously. The government's job is neither to defend its policies nor to hastily admit failure. It is to reveal with data how much and what has had an impact.

In the United States, states are called "laboratories of democracy." One state tries something first, sees the results, and other states either follow or avoid it. The idea of including a sunset clause in laws so that they automatically expire if they are ineffective is based on the same principle. Today's government has big data and AI, which King Sejong could never have imagined. It has become much easier to apply policies to a specific region or target first, publicly announce the expected effects, and compare them with the actual results. If the results are different, they can be corrected. Policy revision is not a defeat. Stubbornly adhering to a mistake even after knowing it is a bigger problem.

In modern times, it's impossible to verify policy validity over a long period, as King Sejong did. In times of economic crisis or disaster, when time is of the essence, we cannot spend months on review. What we can learn from King Sejong is not slow administration, but caution against unverified convictions. King Sejong was a monarch with more power than any president today. Even he did not push through tax policies based solely on his own ideas. He listened first, started small, reconsidered the results, corrected mistakes if they occurred, and expanded only after verification. He understood that good ideas and actual policy outcomes could differ.

Politicians want to prove that their policies are right, but what the Lee Jae-myung administration needs to prove is not its own righteousness, but the fact that the lives of the people have actually improved. This is the lesson that Sejong's Gongbeop reform still teaches us, 600 years later.