정책 이슈

The words presented by President Lee Jae-myung at the press conference on September 18th were brief, but they contained the stance the nation should take. There will be no troop deployment that involves or intervenes in war. There will be no such deployment, whether of troops or assets, and that principle has been maintained so far and will not change in the future. At the same time, minimal activities are necessary to protect our merchant ships, oil transport routes, and the lives and safety of our citizens, and the government is considering strengthening the activities of the Cheonghae Unit already deployed in the Gulf of Aden.

Why shouldn't everything be put into the two words 'troop deployment'?

If these two sentences are bundled together as 'troop deployment,' thinking stops there. Sending combat troops as a party to a war and protecting our citizens and ships on dangerous routes are not the same thing. Other countries also move military resources for their ships and routes, and actual armed conflicts, like with the Houthis, sometimes occur. However, that risk and the status of being a party to a war are not the same. If we fail to distinguish, South Korea will either become an auxiliary force in someone else's war or a country that stands by and watches even if its energy lifeline is cut off. Neither is a choice a sovereign nation should make.

If oil doesn't come in, can the country run on condemnation alone?

Hormuz is not a geopolitics textbook but the breathing room for the Korean economy. About one-fifth of the world's seaborne crude oil passes through this narrow strait, and roughly 70% of Korea's crude oil imports depend on the Middle East, with almost all of that volume passing through this strait. A significant amount of LNG is also tied to the same region. If oil prices rise, import costs swell, leading to a chain reaction in naphtha, petrochemicals, transportation, and inflation. With the prolonged US-Iran conflict in 2026, restricted passage through the strait, and overlapping risks in the Red Sea, the question 'Is it enough to just condemn the US?' becomes not an abstract one but a matter for factories and gas stations. That said, it's not an argument to subtly open the door to war intervention. We must imagine a situation where oil doesn't come in, but that imagination should not become a justification for joining a war.

Solutions for energy security must be considered in three layers. Diplomatically, Korea must voice its concerns as a party in peace treaties, guaranteed passage, and multilateral maritime security consultations. Economically, dependence on the Middle East must be reduced, import sources diversified, and stockpiling and alternative routes institutionalized. Militarily, like the Cheonghae Unit, which is already deployed for anti-piracy and escort missions, minimal defense limited to protecting our vessels must be maintained. If the third layer is expanded without the first two, it becomes intervention in war, and if the first two are done while abandoning the third, the country becomes one that abandons its sailors and oil tankers. The minimal activity the president spoke of is precisely that upper limit.

The Cheonghae Unit is a unit that has been escorting our ships in the Gulf of Aden since 2009. It has parliamentary approval, and its operational area is, in principle, the Gulf of Aden. The recent reinforcement of the Wang Geon-ham's defenses in response to drone threats is a reaction to the reality of that sea area, not an indication that it has become a fleet participating in the Strait of Hormuz conflict. The moment this unit is repackaged into a combined combat formation, its justification, legal basis, and the safety of its service members are all shaken. Reinforcement is possible, but the purpose, area, command authority, and rules of engagement must be firmly established in documents reflecting our sovereignty.

Why Korean troops should not be sent to the US-Iran war

The reasons why Korean troops should not be sent to the US-Iran war are not merely emotional. This conflict is neither a war in which Korea was attacked nor one in which the UN requested collective security from Korea. A system where an alliance's request automatically defines justice does not complement the alliance but rather outsources sovereignty. Although the 2003 deployment to Iraq was packaged as 'reconstruction' and 'alliance,' the political ownership of the war always remained with the United States, and once on the stage, the initiative for withdrawal diminished. The moment our service members are assigned under foreign military command, their lives are tied to the needs of another country's operations, not to the Constitution and the National Assembly. For a country that has not even fully regained wartime operational control to deploy troops to another foreign command system in the Middle East is a double delegation of sovereignty.

The exponential nature of retaliation cannot be ignored. Iran and the Houthis are already using merchant ships in the straits and the Red Sea, as well as regional facilities, as leverage. The moment Korea puts its name on a combined combat formation, its national ships, diplomatic missions, and expatriates will be added to the retaliation list. It's a paradox where the troops sent to protect end up expanding the scope of what needs protection. 'Reconnaissance,' 'mine clearance,' 'technical support,' and 'non-combat assets' are not inherently evil, but if the purpose clause is vague, they can all be interpreted as war support. Permissible activities should be limited to defensive escorting of our national flag, our sailors, and our cargo, and offensive actions, blockades, and support for regime change must be completely blocked. Dispatching troops is not a statement; it's the bodies of young people. Sacrificing even one life in a war with unclear justification is putting the face of an alliance above life itself.

So that slogans don't erode negotiating power

Opposition must also be wise. Strong domestic opposition can become a real card for the government when it's in a tug-of-war with Washington. Saying, 'Our people do not allow it,' lowers the domestic cost of refusal and increases external persuasiveness. Therefore, the task of opposing troop dispatch is not about shouting, but about design. We must pool our strength to increase negotiating power, minimize losses, uphold principles, and secure practical gains. The habit of covering up all structures with an outdated 'anti-American' line every time an issue arises kills that design. The precision that distinguishes ship protection from war involvement disappears, and with it, the persuasiveness the government could use as a basis for refusal.

Standing against imperialism is not about shouting slogans. It is about Korea becoming a nation that no longer aligns its military with the war schedules of other countries. The front line that the people must fight on is not the trenches of the Middle East, but the threshold of parliamentary consent, the act of legally binding the purpose, area, command, and withdrawal conditions of troop dispatch, changing the energy dependence structure, and freeing the transfer of wartime operational control from being a political hostage. Anti-imperialism is not about sending one more warship, but about creating a country that doesn't have to send any.

Why I support Lee Jae-myung's line

The reason I support Lee Jae-myung's line is that he has repeatedly and publicly stated his commitment to non-intervention in war, leaving no room for ambiguity. However, support should not be blind. The public must verify whether the strengthening of the Cheonghae Unit is an extension of the Aden Gulf escort or an indirect entry into the Hormuz joint operation, whether the command is with the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff or effectively transferred to a foreign command, and whether the rules of engagement are limited to defending our ships or broadly opened under the guise of 'freedom of navigation.' Even a slight shift in the boundary can collapse the principle.

The ultimate goal is wartime operational control and self-reliant defense.

The reason we repeatedly find ourselves on such a precipice is not simply because an alliance exists. There's a difference between the alliance itself and a structure where the alliance effectively preempts the use of the Korean military. Debates about overseas troop deployments are always distorted when wartime operational control has not been fully returned. On the surface, it seems like a discussion of 'should we go?', but in reality, it's a test of 'are we a nation that can refuse?' Self-reliant defense is not just a slogan; it's a system that includes intelligence and surveillance, protection of sea lanes, missile and drone defense, energy reserves, defense industry, and the institutional ability to filter alliance requests through constitutional procedures. Even a smart, strong military is only half-effective if it lacks wartime operational control or if its troops are again placed under foreign command overseas.

Therefore, the conclusion of this situation is clear. There will be no sending of Korean combat troops to the US-Iran war. Nor will our merchant ships, sailors, and crude oil be neglected. We will not merely consume opposition as a slogan, but organize it into public pressure to support the government's refusal. The ultimate destination of that pressure is not participation in the Middle East conflict, but the recovery of wartime operational control and self-reliant defense. A nation that does not sacrifice its youth in others' wars, a nation that protects its own ships and oil routes, a nation that manages its alliances but does not surrender its sovereignty to them. The line drawn by Lee Jae-myung is the entrance to that theory. If we fail to guard the entrance, the path will again open to others' operational roads, but if we guard the entrance, Korea will become a party to its own destiny, not a supporting actor in war.