정책 이슈

The issue of the growing influence of Chinese capital in the Korean land market, especially the agricultural land market, has been consistently raised for many years. However, until now, there is virtually no single authoritative statistic that can systematically grasp this issue. Data presented by various institutions such as the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, local governments, the National Assembly, and the media are scattered, and statistical standards are not unified, making it difficult to grasp the overall picture. Nevertheless, when various data are combined, it becomes clear that Chinese capital's ownership of Korean agricultural land is continuously increasing, and the pace has accelerated, especially in the last five years. The problem is that agricultural products produced from this farmland are exported to China rather than being distributed within Korea, and warnings are increasingly gaining traction that this is structurally deepening the instability of domestic agricultural supply and demand and rising prices. Transferring land to Chinese ownership in a divided country is a complete disregard for North Korean compatriots who defected barehanded.

Common Trends Revealed in Fragmented Statistics

Based on various sources, it is clear that Chinese capital's ownership of Korean farmland is steadily increasing, and the pace has accelerated, especially in the last five years. The problem is that agricultural products produced on this farmland are being exported to China rather than being distributed within Korea, and warnings are increasingly gaining traction that this is structurally deepening the instability of domestic agricultural supply and demand and rising prices.

First, it is necessary to address the statistical problem. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport announces the status of land owned by foreigners every year, but this statistic covers 'all land,' so it is difficult for the general public to check data that is separately subdivided by farmland and forest land, and by Chinese nationality only, by year. The Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs also manages the acquisition and use of farmland, but does not disclose annual statistics by foreigner nationality and ownership type in a single table. However, this does not mean that the actual situation cannot be grasped. Data from National Assembly inquiries, local media reports, local government investigation reports, and internal data submitted by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport are scattered in pieces, but when these pieces are put together, the following major trends become clear.

The proportion of Chinese nationals is the largest among foreign-owned land. According to the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport's statistics for 2024, the total foreign-owned land is approximately 260 million square meters, and Chinese nationals account for approximately 40% based on the number of parcels. The proportion of agricultural land and forest land is very high in Chinese-owned land. In some areas, more than half of the Chinese-owned land is agricultural land and forest land, which is particularly noticeable in Jeju, Gangwon, and the outskirts of Gyeonggi. The acquisition of agricultural land has been steadily increasing since the 2010s. There have been many acquisitions of agricultural land near tourist attractions, agricultural land for rural housing, and agricultural land for the development of villas and pensions, and there have been quite a few cases of illegal acquisition. It is estimated that the rate of agricultural land acquisition has accelerated over the past five years (2021-2025). In the data from the National Assembly and local governments, the increase in the number of agricultural land parcels owned by Chinese capital is described as "steep." In the end, although detailed data is lacking, the overall trend of increasing agricultural land ownership by Chinese capital is clear and continuous.

Agricultural Land Acquisition Methods and Structural Loopholes

In order to acquire farmland in Korea, you must, in principle, be a "person who actually farms." However, the reality is different. It is often pointed out that illegal acquisition is very easy because the farmland acquisition procedure is limited to "submission of a plan → review of documents by local governments → formal due diligence." In fact, the following methods are commonly used.

Name Lending (Acquisition under borrowed name): A method of acquiring farmland under the name of a Korean, and in fact, Chinese capital operates it.

Submission of a Formal Farming Plan: A method of obtaining a certificate of eligibility for farmland acquisition by writing "small-scale garden operation" or "test cultivation" on paper even if there is no actual intention to farm.

Indirect Investment in the Form of a Corporation: There are also a significant number of cases where a Korean corporation is established and farmland is acquired in the name of the corporation.

An even bigger problem is that statistics fail to properly capture such nominee or roundabout acquisitions. This is precisely why the criticism that the farmland owned by Chinese nationals appearing in official statistics is likely to be "the minimum number that is visible" is repeatedly raised.

Chinese Destination of Agricultural Products Produced from Farmland

A practical threat to 'food security'. The act of Chinese capital purchasing Korean farmland can be controversial in itself, but a more serious problem is the increasing number of cases where agricultural products produced from this farmland are not distributed within Korea but are directly exported to the Chinese market. According to media and parliamentary reports, the following structure is already entrenched in some areas. Chinese capital secures farmland. Chinese-owned agricultural corporations or entrusted farmers are in charge of cultivation. The harvested agricultural products hardly go through domestic distribution networks. All or a large quantity is exported to China.

In this process, there are many cases where not a single quantity is supplied to the Korean agricultural market. In other words, the phenomenon of agricultural products produced in Korean land not being used for Korean tables is already happening. This immediately leads to a structural vicious cycle of domestic agricultural product shortages → price increases → deepening supply and demand instability.

Invisible Causes of Rising Domestic Agricultural Product Prices

In recent years, the price of agricultural products in Korea has been steadily rising due to various factors such as climate issues, distribution structure issues, and food inflation. However, a relatively less discussed factor among these is the reduction in domestic production volume due to the increase in foreign capital farmland ownership. Why does this lead to price increases? The farmland itself decreases. The moment farmland is transferred to foreign capital, it is the same as reducing Korea's agricultural infrastructure. In particular, the structural loss increases as highly productive plains or farmland around tourist destinations disappear. Domestic supply of products decreases. If the amount of agricultural products grown for export increases, the amount entering the domestic market decreases. This immediately leads to an overall price increase. The local agricultural base collapses. If farmland is transferred to foreign capital and corporations instead of actual local residents, the local agricultural and livestock ecosystem weakens. If small farms cannot be maintained, the sustainability of production also collapses. Foreign capital is not affected by price fluctuations.

They operate based on sales prices and profitability in China, regardless of domestic prices.

In other words, from the perspective of Korean consumers, they are "actors who do not participate in domestic supply adjustments." As a result, the issue of Chinese capital farmland can be seen as one of the causes of the imbalance in the supply and demand of the domestic agricultural market.

Risks from the perspective of the principle that "food is security"

Many countries define food security as a strategic industry. The United States, Japan, Europe, and others strongly restrict foreign ownership of farmland within their borders, and some countries virtually prohibit foreign ownership of farmland. On the other hand, Korea's regulations are lax. In a country where supply is already insufficient, if foreign capital secures farmland and exports agricultural products to its own country, this should be seen as a loss in terms of national security. Food security is not a matter of production volume. The three key aspects of food security are whether there is a direct supply that can be provided to our people in a crisis situation, whether farmland and agricultural infrastructure can be maintained continuously, and whether foreign capital gains market control. If the domestic agricultural base is eroded by the expansion of Chinese capital's farmland holdings, Korea could be exposed to supply and demand shocks at any time. In particular, the impact will be even greater when external factors such as abnormal weather, war, and supply chain conflicts between countries occur.

Future Required Actions

Responding to this issue requires a complex approach that goes beyond 'strengthening regulations.'

① Transparent Disclosure of Farmland Statistics by Nationality and Use

Currently, the biggest problem is that the public cannot access accurate data.

For farmland, it is necessary to transparently disclose nationality, ownership type, corporate shareholding, cultivated items, and distribution channels.

② Strengthening Regulations on Foreign Acquisition of Farmland

The farmland acquisition qualification review should be strengthened, and a verification system for nominee and indirect investments should be created.

The principle of 'acquisition under real name' should be supplemented, and an upper limit on foreign capital farmland acquisition could be introduced.

③ Management of agricultural product export and distribution structure

There is a need to improve the system to prevent the phenomenon of agricultural products produced in Korea from completely leaving the domestic supply chain.

A plan to mandate the supply of a certain percentage of products to the domestic market can also be considered.

④ Comprehensive strategy for food security

The issue of foreign capital owning farmland is not a real estate market issue, but a food security issue.

The agricultural base must be protected by establishing mid- to long-term measures at the national level.

"Farmland is not just land."

For a long time, Korean society has treated farmland as merely a 'development target' or an 'investment asset.' However, farmland is not just a simple asset but a national strategic infrastructure that sustains the survival of the people. Currently, in Korea, this core resource is directly exposed to foreign capital, and the agricultural products they produce are flowing to foreign countries instead of our dining tables. This issue is not about guarding against Chinese capital. It is a question of how the state views the meaning of farmland and how it prepares for the future food system. If this phenomenon continues without Korea reorganizing its farmland statistics and management system, the rise in domestic agricultural product prices and food security instability are likely to appear in more severe forms in the future. This is a structural problem that can no longer be neglected, and a clear response and strategy are needed at the national level. South Korea, which is thorough in regulating land use by its own citizens, should fundamentally re-examine why it cannot conduct a proper full investigation or understand the actual situation regarding land use by foreigners holding foreign nationality. Thinking about history, it is right to be disgusted.