On November 3, 2026, voting for the US midterm elections is underway. Although the results are not yet out, the pre-election landscape was already quite clear. The Reuters report on November 1 was not mere speculation. Since April, the White House has been considering pushing policies through executive action in preparation for the possibility of Democrats controlling Congress. Deputy Chief of Staff Steven Miller, OMB Director Russell Vought, and White House Counsel Will Scharf led the effort to compile measures that could be pursued without congressional approval in the areas of immigration, tariffs, housing costs, and federal spending. Specifically mentioned were additional tariffs on critical minerals and wind turbines, stricter visas for international students and temporary foreign workers, and reallocating priorities within already congressionally approved budgets or changing subsidy rules to increase the influence of political appointees. At the same time, preparations were underway to deal with investigations and subpoenas from a Democratic Congress. Federal agencies had already submitted unilateral actions and legal review materials, and Director Vought was exploring ways to circumvent Congress's power of the purse through existing budget reallocation and changes to subsidy regulations.
Trump publicly declared he would be “Mr. Veto.” In a New York Post podcast interview, he stated that if Democrats passed laws, he would veto all of them, and after a month or two, they would realize it was a waste of time and come to negotiate. While the Korean media's phrase “plan to ignore Congress” adds interpretation, the direction is clear. It's not about completely ignoring Congress, but rather pushing as much as possible through executive power in areas where Congress is not needed, and blocking necessary legislation with veto power. Already in his second term, Trump has aggressively used executive power in tariffs, immigration enforcement, and spending impoundments, and Director Vought has shown moves to effectively neutralize the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act. Some “pocket rescissions” have faced legality challenges from the Government Accountability Office and the courts. This preparation is not just an emergency plan, but an expression of his determination to push his agenda regardless of the election results.
Trump's misjudgment lies in his consistent underestimation of opinion polls and political reality. Several models before the midterm elections indicated a high probability of Democrats taking the majority in the House, and the final Sabato's Crystal Ball assessment projected at least 239 Democratic seats (Leans Democratic) to 196 Republican seats (D+24) in the House. While the Senate race was tight, some models increasingly predicted a Democratic advantage. Democrats also held an advantage of around 8 points in the generic ballot. Despite this, Trump has consistently countered, claiming "the tide is turning" and dismissing it as "fake news."
There was a clear discrepancy between public statements and internal preparations, as the White House had been preparing for defeat for months. He toured the country appealing to Republicans to maintain their support, but his staff was preparing for a completely different political landscape in 2027. This discrepancy is not simply optimism, but stems from a habit of fitting reality to his own narrative. The argument that polls can be wrong is based on the experiences of 2016 and 2024, but the environment in 2026 was one where approval ratings had fallen to the low 30s amid inflation, tariffs, and the cost of overseas military action. In the latest Reuters/Ipsos poll (October 29-November 2), Trump's approval rating was 32%, almost the same as his recent low of 31%. The root of the miscalculation lies in the belief that his political intuition is superior to data.
The essence of Oman's approach is the mindset of "I can do without Congress." The U.S. Constitution clearly grants legislative power, budgetary authority, and oversight power to Congress. The President has veto power, executive orders, foreign policy, and military command, but cannot create new laws or make large-scale new expenditures at will. Tariffs must also be based on existing laws, such as the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and are subject to judicial review. Already in his second term, excessive exercise of executive power has led to lawsuits and political backlash. If the Democratic Party controls the House or both chambers, investigative powers, subpoenas, and budgetary control will shift to the opposition. Trump's statement, "If you veto and veto, they will come to negotiate," is based on the calculation that it will be difficult for the Democratic Party to secure a two-thirds majority in both chambers.
However, if even bipartisan bills are all rejected, the risk of a government shutdown and worsening public opinion increases, and the courts are highly likely to again question excessive spending impoundment. This stance aligns with the inclinations of Trump himself and his close aides. They tend to view bureaucrats, Congress, and the media as a 'deep state' or obstacles, and seek to expand executive power as much as possible to achieve policy goals. As a result, attempts to significantly tilt the balance of the separation of powers towards the executive branch are repeated. This is not read as 'strong leadership,' but rather as arrogance attempting to subordinate institutions to one's will. Historically, just as Nixon's spending impoundment, coupled with impeachment investigations, led to the enactment of control laws, excessive expansion of executive power ultimately faces backlash.
The United States still maintains an overwhelming advantage in military, finance, technology, and soft power. However, there are clear signs of deepening internal divisions. While it is historically common for the ruling party to suffer significant losses in midterm elections, this time it appears to be the result of a combination of inflation and tariff shocks, the cost of overseas military actions, and declining approval ratings. If the Democratic Party gains control of Congress, the latter half of Trump's second term is likely to be filled with legislative paralysis and investigative offensives. If stalemates over budget bills are repeated, the very operation of the government will be shaken, and allied nations abroad will develop distrust, thinking, “U.S. domestic politics cause policies to change frequently.” If tariff and immigration policies are maintained solely by executive orders, they can easily be overturned by courts and subsequent administrations. This weakens America's external credibility and policy continuity.
From Korea's perspective, issues such as the US Forces Korea, defense costs, supply chains, and tariffs are all connected to this domestic political instability. The more Trump tries to push policies through by bypassing Congress, the more transactional and unstable agreements with allies become. It is possible to interpret the extreme polarization and institutional weakening within the US as one aspect of its relative decline. However, exaggerating this as the 'beginning of a downfall' could lead to the error of underestimating America's remaining capabilities and potential for recovery. The current situation is closer to a 'phase of deepening internal fatigue and political dysfunction within the empire.' While still strong externally, if domestic political paralysis prolongs, it becomes difficult to project that power consistently.
This strategy is partially feasible. Tariffs, immigration enforcement, reallocation of existing budgets, and foreign policy direction can be pushed to some extent without Congress. The veto power itself is a constitutional authority, and it is realistically difficult for the Democratic Party to secure a two-thirds majority. However, there are clear limitations. New large-scale legislation or spending is impossible. The forced suspension of already approved budget enforcement is subject to lawsuits, and some have already been ruled illegal. While the investigative powers of a Democratic Congress can be blocked by executive privilege, political and public opinion damage is unavoidable. Excessive abuse of executive power can also be checked by a conservative Supreme Court and easily reversed in the event of a change of administration in 2028. The changes to subsidy rules that Director Boat intends to pursue could strengthen political control, but they cannot avoid backlash from Congress and the courts. Ultimately, the outcome of this strategy is likely to be 'deepening gridlock and conflict' rather than 'governance.' The very preparation to bypass Congress reveals a distrust of institutions and a desire for concentrated power, which is close to arrogance that has lost its constitutional sense of balance. In a democratic country, preparing bypass routes in advance instead of accepting election results and negotiating shows a lack of institutional confidence.
Trump's arrogance stems from the belief that 'I am above the system.' While there were moments when that belief held true, the limits of it will soon be revealed after the midterm elections. As American politics descends into deeper paralysis and mutual distrust, the repercussions will be fully felt by its allies. It is more accurate to view this not as a problem of Trump personally, but as a scene where the polarized American political system reveals its own dysfunction. Attempts to maximize executive power may sustain some policies in the short term, but in the long term, they erode institutional trust and policy continuity. This phase, marked by misjudgment and arrogance, once again exposes the structural vulnerabilities of American politics. The ballot boxes have already been opened, and the results will soon tell how close this analysis was to reality.