천하天下

Ukraine's choices have not benefited it, neither on the front lines nor in its diplomacy towards Korea. Deep strikes against Russian oil facilities did not reduce the damage to the capital Kyiv, and the unilateral disclosure of the repatriation of North Korean prisoners of war only shattered the trust of a country desperately in need of air defense support. As the war drags on, external ammunition, air defense, and reconstruction funds become necessary, but the Zelensky government has turned those who could provide such aid into targets of pressure. The Lee Jae-myung government's response is not an emotional counterattack to that breakdown. It is a minimal measure to preserve the form of agreement and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The source of the misstep lies not in Seoul, but in Kyiv.

The limitations on the front lines have already been revealed in numbers. In mid-September, Ukraine launched over 1,000 drones towards Russia. Zelensky stated that they had struck key oil and logistics facilities, and that Russia should end the brutal war and choose peace. The words were peace, but the means were escalation. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that it had intercepted over 1,100 drones, and the mayor of Moscow said that 450 drones flying towards the capital had been shot down. Although it was described as the largest scale ever, there was no evidence that Moscow's political center had been shaken. The pillars of fire from the oil refineries were news for a day, and the front line positions remained unchanged. The assumption that deep strikes would break Russia's will to wage war did not hold true, at least this autumn.

The response from the other side was not restraint, but an increase in the intensity of retaliation. Russia's jet-propelled drones increased from 350 in June to 2,800 in August, and with speeds of 400-600 kilometers per hour, reports followed that the interception rate had dropped from around 90 percent to 60 percent. Cheap and fast weapons began to routinely penetrate the capital's air defense network. On September 5, the National Security Service building was hit for the first time since the invasion, on the 27th, a building used as the Saudi Arabian ambassador's residence was damaged, and on the 28th, in broad daylight, the National Academy of Sciences was attacked, resulting in casualties. The area around Volodymyrska Street, where government buildings and embassies are concentrated, had previously been considered relatively untouched. A local expert's comment that there was an implicit line that state institutions would not be directly targeted to avoid escalation is also an assessment that this line has been broken.

This means that Ukraine's refinery strikes did not stop Russia's attacks on the capital. Instead, they drew targets to government and diplomatic facilities and bridges that had remained safe zones. The premise that provocation creates leverage collapses the moment the damage returns to Kyiv, not Moscow. As shown by the temporary suspension of air raids on Kyiv to coincide with the US envoy's schedule, the actual breathing room came from external political schedules, not the number of drones. What is needed in the fourth year of the war is not another deep strike, but diplomacy to manage the already skewed war of attrition.

Diplomacy towards South Korea blatantly repeated that misjudgment. When President Lee Jae-myung and Zelensky held their first summit on the occasion of the NATO summit in July, both sides agreed to deal with the issue of North Korean prisoners of war in accordance with international law, humanitarian principles, and the free will of the parties concerned. The South Korean government's position was to keep the repatriation plan confidential in accordance with that principle. Confidentiality was not a condition unilaterally imposed by South Korea. The National Intelligence Service reported to the National Assembly's Intelligence Committee that confidentiality was a consensus requested by the Ukrainian side from the beginning. The parties themselves wanted quiet handling for the safety and will of the prisoners, and the management of the repatriation process. South Korea was the one that adhered to that format.

In August, Zelensky specifically mentioned Korea, stating that he wanted support for air defense systems. The government virtually refused, citing its principle of prohibiting support for lethal weapons. This refusal is not a cold shoulder. Sending Korean-made artillery and interceptor systems to a war where North Korean troops are fighting on the Russian side is not humanitarian aid; it is opening a path for escalation on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea does not separate the use of those weapons from its experience in the war. The line of treating prisoner repatriation as humanitarian while not sending lethal weapons is the most consistent position a non-belligerent country can take. The doors for reconstruction, non-lethal aid, and humanitarian cooperation remain open within that line. What Korea closed was not artillery, but the entrance to escalation.

The Zelensky government twisted that line into a tool for pressure. In late September, it publicly announced the transfer of prisoners to Korea on the international stage. The National Intelligence Service analyzed that Ukraine likely disclosed this hoping for weapons support, and that no such support was provided. After being refused aid, Ukraine broke the confidentiality it had initially requested and used the prisoners as a card in a public relations battle. Diplomacy that shames the party that upheld an agreement to force a policy change is not negotiation. It is closer to betrayal. Prisoners are people, and repatriation is predicated on the consent and safety of the individuals involved. The moment this is publicly used as leverage in air defense weapon negotiations, humanitarianism becomes an excuse and prisoners become props. If what Ukraine desperately needs from Korea is an air defense network, then that public disclosure was at the very top of the list of things not to do.

On October 2, President Lee stated that Ukraine had requested confidentiality regarding the progress of the situation, but then unilaterally disclosed it. When the President of the Republic of Korea expressed regret with the utmost courtesy, Ukraine denied any agreement, effectively calling the head of state of a partner country a liar. When asked to acknowledge the agreement and apologize, Ukraine instead brought up the possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula, claiming that a military conflict between the North and South was imminent. This was against the backdrop of Budanov, the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Office, warning that North Korea's combat experience could lead to actual combat and conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Denying the words of the Korean President under the pretext of prisoner repatriation and talking about war on the Korean Peninsula is not a request for assistance. It is a threat. For a country seeking help to provoke security instability in a country that can provide help is an abandonment of the basics of diplomacy. The statement that further measures would be taken if the acknowledgment of facts and a public apology continued to be refused is not an overreaction. The declaration that this issue, concerning the dignity of the nation and its people, cannot be overlooked, is the minimum response any government should make. If a head of state, whose agreement has been denied and who has been told that war is being instigated, remains silent, then diplomacy collapses.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' belated statement that Korea is important and that they sincerely want to resolve the diplomatic misunderstanding is damage control, not an explanation. When pressure didn't work, they spoke of importance. The word "misunderstanding" doesn't fit the facts. The request for confidentiality, unilateral disclosure, denial of agreement, and mention of war on the Korean Peninsula are not misunderstandings but a series of actions. Actions are only retracted with an apology. Saying something is important and treating it as important are different. Defense cooperation, reconstruction, and non-lethal aid are only possible when trust remains. The party that first breaks that trust and delays an apology will suffer losses. Korea said it would treat prisoners humanely, would not send lethal weapons, and only drew a line at the breach of agreement, false denial, and mention of war on the Korean Peninsula. All three judgments are consistent. What is inconsistent is Kyiv's diplomacy, which returned rejection with betrayal.

The legitimacy of the Lee Jae-myung administration becomes even clearer here. First, refusing lethal weapons is not about hostility towards Ukraine, but about managing the Korean Peninsula. In a war where North Korean military involvement has been confirmed, the transfer of South Korean air defense weapons would not affect Ukrainian airspace, but rather the military standoff between North and South Korea. Not opening up that variable is not a departure from the alliance, but an obligation of a country that is not a direct party. Second, maintaining confidentiality is adhering to a format that Ukraine requested first. In a situation where the requesting party breaks it and accuses the adhering party of lying, demanding correction and apology is not an overreaction, but a restoration of facts. Third, the announcement of additional measures stems from the judgment that the same tactics will be repeated if the issue of dignity is neglected. To an opponent who escalated from publicizing prisoners of war to talking about war on the Korean Peninsula when weapon support was not forthcoming, lines are not drawn by words alone. Fourth, the door to humanitarian aid has not been closed. The July principles of free will and international law remain. What has been closed is only the demand to change principles through threats.

The Zelensky government's miscalculation was believing that a deep blow on the front lines would deter Russia, and that publicizing prisoners of war in diplomacy would break South Korea's weapons policy. Both disregarded the opponent's retaliation and constraints. Russia broke sacred ground and attacked bridges and universities, and South Korea responded to the denial of an agreement with demands for apology and additional measures. The result is the disappearance of Kyiv's safe zone and open conflict with a country that could provide help. What a capital whose public opinion is leaning towards negotiation needs is not another provocation. It is to acknowledge and apologize for the agreement it broke. As long as this order is reversed, Ukraine's escalatory diplomacy will not move either Russia or South Korea. What moves is only its own isolation. Not losing desperately needed help in a desperate way—that is almost the only diplomatic exit left for Kyiv now.