아픈 손가락

Unprepared Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Korea and China

Around the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and China on August 24, 1992, Koreans cautiously met with Joseonjok (Korean-Chinese), the descendants of 'independence fighters' who roamed the Manchurian fields during the Japanese colonial period. Although there were significant differences in political systems, namely socialism and democracy, and in culture, it cannot be denied that it contributed to awakening the desire for 'ancient territory' of Goguryeo Manchuria that had been dormant in the Korean consciousness. However, that consciousness was manipulated to be limited to the economic field, and it could not produce academic achievements. Without questioning the past, the vague Manchurian fields are just an imaginary story. No one even knows the real location of Manchuria, so no one cares about what independence is or why the anti-Japanese struggle was fought in Manchuria. This is still an unwritten rule.

After the Korean War, the prolonged division of the Korean Peninsula turned Korea into a kind of 'island that is not an island'. It also became impossible to take the 'Trans-Eurasian Railway' that ran from Busan through the Manchurian fields to Europe. Poet Ko Eun lamented that Koreans, the descendants of Goguryeo, had lost the magnificent spirit of the continent, narrowing the scope of their thoughts and actions, but it is a story that the generation who experienced the forced name change knows but remains silent about. Due to the nature of territorial warfare, colonialism threatened human survival with all sorts of ruthless and heinous methods in the process of seizing land, leaving shame and trauma.

In this respect, the establishment of diplomatic relations with modern China, although a detour for Korea, became an opportunity to awaken the grand dream of advancing into the continent, at least economically. In addition, Koreans thought that the way was opened to directly confirm and even restore the sites of ancient, medieval, and modern history of the Korean people scattered throughout mainland China. In the process, they also expected the Korean-Chinese, who are of the same Korean ethnicity, to become important guides to concretely realize the Korean people's dream of the continent. Up to this point, it is a part that the mainstream society accepts to some extent, but if you take just one step further, the deeply rooted flunkeyism is self-restrained.

The excessive 'close ties' that arise from Koreans' expectations for advancing into the continent and recognizing Korean-Chinese as the same Korean ethnicity inevitably provoke the Chinese government's vigilance and resistance. For the four years leading up to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and China in 1992, the Chinese government had been sensitive to Koreans' perception of Korean-Chinese. When Prime Minister Lee Hong-koo visited Chinese Premier Li Peng in 1995, Premier Li made an unprecedented remark that was not on the agenda, which was very unusual in diplomatic practice.

At the time, some Korean businessmen, tourists, and scholars directly protested and requested restraint from treating Joseonjok people as if they were Korean and Manchuria as if it were Korean territory. For the Chinese government, the Joseonjok issue is not limited to one of the 56 ethnic minorities. It is closely related to Taiwan, as well as Tibet, Xinjiang Uyghur, and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, where separatist and independence movements continue. If the Kim Young-sam government had not backed down at this time and had taken a strong stance, we would not be encountering Chinese tourists playing with relics and defecating in Gyeongbokgung Palace as we do now. Korea's political stance of starting with its back turned from the first button instills a low posture and a low-grade inferiority complex in the other party in all aspects of the economy, society, and culture.

From the perspective of the Chinese government, if any one of the 56 ethnic minorities succeeds in independence or excessively increases its political power, it is inevitable that they will express aversion to the excessive closeness between Joseonjok people and Korea, as it could lead to an uncontrollable system collapse like the former Soviet Union. In addition, it is based on the perception that it will inevitably have a negative impact on the unification with Taiwan, which China is pursuing with long-term goals. Korea, which severed ties with Taiwan in order to establish diplomatic relations with China, has been perceived as a pushover in many ways, even falling behind Taiwan, which is close to Japan, and its political low posture has solidified into cultural alienation. In the first place, China's unification of Taiwan has the potential to be penny-wise and pound-foolish, but Korea, which has completely lost its history, consistently maintains a makeshift attitude in everything, making it impossible to establish long-term plans even economically.

The Chinese government reacted quite sensitively to South Korea's Korean-Chinese policy, and the fact that the Chinese Premier publicly pointed out the excessive South Korea-closeness of the Korean-Chinese to the South Korean Prime Minister, even at the risk of diplomatic discourtesy, indicates that they seriously recognized the problem with South Korea's 'nationalistic' approach to Korean-Chinese compatriots, which had continued for several years since the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and China in 1992. Precisely this point, which public institution dedicated itself to and continued the research on the historical reasons why a nationalistic approach was possible? Not a single institution connected history to the continent.

In fact, even when the Overseas Korean Act was created in 1999, China demanded that special treatment not be given to Chinese Koreans (Korean-Chinese), citing the international practice of 'prioritizing nationality over bloodline.' Since then, while wary of South Korea's nationalistic movements such as the Overseas Korean Act, China has implemented policies emphasizing a sense of belonging to China, such as starting ideological education with the content 'The homeland of the Korean-Chinese is China' targeting the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in northeastern China. Rather, the policy of attributing the Korean-Chinese's sense of belonging to 'China' may have been the result of South Korea-China diplomatic relations buttoning the first button wrong.

In the 2010s, the Chinese government also began to operate the "Building a Unified Chinese Nation Family" project. This Chinese nation is a new concept that did not exist in China before. This concept, which emerged in 2012, was created to bring all ethnic groups residing in China under one roof called the 'Chinese nation'. It is, in a way, a roadmap for national integration. Since then, China has been strengthening its 'ethnic cleansing policy' by implementing a 'bilingual education policy' for ethnic minorities, attempting to reduce the unique languages of ethnic minorities to the level of a second foreign language. This nationalistic idea seems to have shifted to a policy of self-isolation by reducing the importance of English in the Gaokao (高考), the current college entrance examination system.

Double Hardship and Heterogeneity

The Korean government also expressed its difficulties, saying that it had no choice but to take a limited and cautious approach to the 'entry and exit' issue of Joseonjok due to China's sensitive reaction immediately after the establishment of diplomatic ties between Korea and China. The Joseonjok are of Korean descent who have established relatively solid roots in Chinese society after navigating the unfortunate and arduous diaspora of over 130 years. However, the Joseonjok are clearly citizens of the People's Republic of China.

How should we view and resolve the 130 years between the past and the present? The result of starting economic exchanges without political and academic discussions is more devastating than expected. Discussing the economy while heterogeneous emotions run parallel makes it difficult to bring about a desirable future. Communist countries and democracies have different visions of development. What justification is there for blocking exchanges with North Korea because it is a communist country, while engaging in exchanges with China, which follows the same communist line despite various discords? The North Korean communist regime is much less heterogeneous. The 33 years of diplomatic relations between Korea and China leave us with this question. The Korean government must answer this question.

The government points out that it is fundamentally difficult to establish any policies because Korean-Chinese are foreigners, not overseas Koreans. Lee Hyung-gyu, a foreign affairs and security reviewer at the Prime Minister's Office for Administrative Coordination, which comprehensively coordinates overseas Korean policies, said, "The issue of Korean-Chinese people inevitably requires policies that take into account avoiding diplomatic friction with China" (The 'Wrong Encounter' Between Koreans and Korean-Chinese, Reporter Jang Young-hee, Sisa Journal, September 19, 1996).

From the beginning, the Korean government did not pay special attention to the existence of Korean-Chinese compatriots in the process of promoting diplomatic relations between Korea and China, and naturally, there were virtually no customized policies tailored to the Korean-Chinese. Later, as Korean-Chinese compatriots 'workers' flooded into the Korean labor market, the Overseas Korean Act and new immigration visa policies were implemented to try to improve the treatment of Korean-Chinese compatriots, but by this time, due to the checks and resistance from the Chinese government, the establishment of Korean-Chinese policies was also in a situation where they had to be mindful of the 'Chinese nation'. This policy failure is due to the failure to shift from the rough-and-tumble thinking that has continued through colonialism-liberation-war-dictatorship. This dualistic and heterogeneous policy of absence of values lies in the fact that Korea's development is tailored to the tastes of some vested interests. This issue is a domestic issue and will be explained in a different chapter, so it is excluded here.

In any case, due to the Chinese government's blatant 'Chinese nationalism', the Korean government's forward-looking and inclusive policy-making for Korean-Chinese is bound to face strong resistance, such as diplomatic friction with China. Korea's 'inclusion' of Korean-Chinese has triggered checks from China that it is an excessive intervention of nationalism, and China is also using policies to completely incorporate Korean-Chinese as Chinese people due to 'Chinese nationalism', and the Korean-Chinese issue has become a political controversy depending on the interests and diplomatic pragmatism of both Korea and China. It can be seen that the Chinese government's sense of check on the strengthening of Korean nationalism also influenced the exclusion of Korean-Chinese from the scope of application of the Overseas Korean Act enacted in 1999. It cannot be said that the tastes of some vested interests mentioned above are not underlying this diplomatic failure.

Of course, there is a reason why the Korean government has no choice but to strictly manage the 'immigration policy' of Korean-Chinese compatriots, which causes a massive influx of cheap labor and illegal stay problems. However, since China has linked the Korean-Chinese issue to its sovereignty of 'protecting Chinese citizens' since the establishment of diplomatic ties between Korea and China, it is true that there are many limitations for Korea to handle the Korean-Chinese policy 'independently'.

Along with the Korean government's difficulties with the Korean-Chinese issue, Koreans also have concerns inherent in their perception of Korean-Chinese. It is the Red Complex (meaning that antipathy toward communism is maximized, and any ideology is referred to as communism to reject it). Chinese Korean compatriots have historical experience of supporting the founding of China and North Korea through the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War.

The so-called mainstream historical view of Korea maintains an atmosphere in which the history of this process is not taught or studied at all. At the same time, the excessive anti-communism education has encouraged the public to consume the communist complex only emotionally. Decades of dictatorial politics based on anti-communism were the basic policy of Korean education, and even now, the generation immediately after the war cannot escape the shackles. This thorough double play fails to explain the policy contradictions of China's exchange policy. In the end, it makes us ask again what and for whom anti-communism was for, and what the meaning of 'nation' really is. I think it is the colonial-dominated 'nation' who became a poet who lamented the cramped, clumsy, and servile ethnicity.

Contradiction in Value System

Even though the 'pro-China, pro-North Korea' activities of Korean-Chinese were a means for their survival and an unavoidable choice entangled in the shackles of history, Koreans still tend to view Korean-Chinese with the prejudice of being 'communists.' In particular, as the confrontational structure of inter-Korean relations has deepened due to North Korea's three-generation hereditary system and nuclear weapons development, the red complex for Koreans is perceived as a phenomenon related to the issue of national survival beyond simply feeling aversion to the communist system. This is also a result of the rise of contradictions. No matter where you go in the world, North Korean nukes are at the top of international news. I see this as an instigation. North Korea's self-defense is not tolerated, and China's various nuclear tests are not even reported on the damage. This is a global agenda, and Korea is just a faithful maid to it.

Thinking back to the time when there were Koreans immigrating to Shanghai when the development of diplomatic relations between Korea and China was in full swing, while simultaneously calling both Korean-Chinese and North Korean residents communists, it is not easy for the public, who have been raised with ignorant attributes, to realize this. Livelihood comes first, but for the future of Korea, it is necessary to teach the basic philosophy of life, not ideology. If we fail to overcome the contradiction of value inversion, we will have our entire lives taken away by political propaganda. I believe our history is living proof of that.

In fact, many Koreans ask why we should understand and embrace Korean-Chinese compatriots when they themselves say they are Chinese. It is debatable whether Korean-Chinese compatriots helped North Korea and participated in the Korean War or showed a friendly attitude toward the Chinese Communist Party. However, this seems to be the result of judging only by the phenomenon rather than understanding the true meaning of the claim or the context of history, and the problem arises as the public finds it difficult to learn as the phenomenon is brainwashed from time to time and the cycle becomes shorter. The failure to reflect the public's questioning of cultural heterogeneity toward Korean-Chinese who already use Chinese in policy leads to the problem of value inversion. This is a situation that occurs in Korea, which has been aiming for a single-ethnic nation, because the nation and the people are the same.

In 1949, Syngman Rhee advocated the Ilminism (一民主義) governing ideology in order to eliminate internal divisions within the nation as a matter of urgency. Ahn Ho-sang, the first Minister of Education who was a philosopher, ideologized the theory of Ilminism by emphasizing the absolute element of the same bloodline, but he, who studied in Japan, Germany, and England and experienced the hotbed of all ideologies, introduced Dangun nationalism that encompassed all doctrines. This is a phenomenon that occurred as the whole world was mixed up by the movement of peoples. It is necessary to reinterpret the value inversion in which the contradiction of the concept of nation leads to the contradiction of the system, not from the economic loss aspect, but from the philosophical problem and the problem of existence. Economic value is a materialistic perspective, but at least Ahn Ho-sang tried to synthesize materialism and idealism, so I think that coexistence and win-win should be the basis of policy rather than each nation's superiority.

However, in China, a multi-ethnic country, 56 ethnic groups make up the Chinese people. Therefore, from the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party, when referring to the people in terms of nationality, the Korean-Chinese compatriots are naturally Chinese citizens and Chinese people. Among the Korean-Chinese compatriots, there are still some who proudly talk about their participation in the Korean War, which is embarrassing, but some say that the world has changed, so we should approach it more carefully now. National education cannot but be accompanied by the promotion of patriotism, and when that patriotism is communism, we should rethink the conflicting values.

The discomfort with the Korean-Chinese compatriots' friendly attitude toward the Chinese Communist Party may be more of a result of the discomfort with the Communist Party that has taken root in the minds of Koreans as a result of anti-communist education, rather than their problem. In the end, all of this is a problem of perception due to cultural differences and a lack of understanding of Korean-Chinese history ('Korean-Chinese, Who Are They?' p375, written by Kwak Seung-ji, Human Love, 2023).

Restoring Historicity is Policy

However, the confusion of identity that Korean-Chinese compatriots themselves have and the entrenchment of their negative perceptions of Korean society are also problems. Some scholars analyze that the reason why Korean-Chinese compatriots have become more interested in the Chinese nation (China) identity stems from their experiences in Korean society. Korean-Chinese compatriots felt invisible hierarchical differences with Koreans while suffering severe discrimination and contempt in Korea, relied more on social relationships formed in China, and deepened their identity and self-awareness as Korean-Chinese themselves ('Korean-Chinese, Who Are They?' p361, written by Kwak Seung-ji, Human Love, 2023).

Some experts argue that the pro-China national (people) identity of Korean-Chinese compatriots is due to Korean society's failure to properly understand and embrace them. However, on the other hand, there is also the problem that Korean-Chinese compatriots are solidifying biased thinking towards further strengthening their animosity towards Korea due to 'fragmented experiences' of receiving discrimination and disregard and contempt for the poor in Korea. The fundamental cause lies in the lack of history in desk administration that has led to discrimination and contempt from Koreans, but Korean-Chinese compatriots also need to think about where the economic system of the Chinese Communist Party, which induces extreme competition in capitalism, will drive humans. The existentialism disappearance that applies to Koreans, Chinese, and Korean-Chinese is judged to be indisputable in that the current economic system sees humans as tools, not subjects.

The number of Korean-Chinese compatriots working in Korea is decreasing. Lee Kyu-yong of the Korea Labor Institute gave a presentation on the topic of Korean-Chinese in Korea and the Korean labor market, pointing out that the employment rate of Korean-Chinese in Korea is decreasing from 73.4% in 2017 to 69.5% in 2019 and 66.5% in 2021 ('Korean-Chinese in Korea and Law, Institutions, and Economy' Incheon Today Reporter Park Gyu-ho 2022.9.30).

There are also statistics that the number of Korean-Chinese workers in Korea, which was close to 300,000 before the outbreak of COVID-19, has been halved in just a few years. According to data from related ministries such as the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Employment and Labor on September 18, 2023, the number of Korean-Chinese (Korean-Chinese H-2) workers in Korea, which reached 226,322 at the end of 2019 before the outbreak of COVID-19, has decreased significantly to 105,671 as of July 2023. This is a decrease of more than 120,000 people in 4 years and 7 months. This is because many of the elderly workers who stayed in Korea after the outbreak of COVID-19 returned to their home country, and the atmosphere of reluctance to work in Korea is spreading as wage levels in China rise ("Korean-Chinese workers halved in 4 years...replacing them with more skilled foreign workers" News Pim Reporter Jeong Seong-hoon 2023.9.19).

As the Chinese economy has surpassed that of Korea and labor costs have risen to a certain level, the "Korean Dream" of Korean-Chinese compatriots is a thing of the past. This is also influenced by the change in consciousness of Korean-Chinese compatriots who would rather live comfortably in China, which is like their "hometown," even if it means accepting slightly lower wages, rather than earning money with difficulty while suffering all kinds of discrimination and contempt in unfamiliar Korean society. In some regions, they earn and spend more than in Seoul. Now, Korean-Chinese compatriots have been mainly working in 3D industries that Koreans are reluctant to work in, such as accommodation and food service, social welfare services, and agriculture and fisheries, and a massive exodus continues to occur. In response, the government has embarked on an attempt to fill the vacant jobs of Korean-Chinese by drastically increasing the number of skilled foreign workers from Southeast Asia and other regions in the mid- to long-term.

Korean-Chinese compatriots, who speak the same language as Koreans and are of the same ethnicity, could have played an important role in the labor market with their skilled technology, but it should be seen as a failure for Korean-Chinese compatriots to positively assimilate into our society due to the lack of long-term policies by the Korean government, China's checks, and the red complex of Koreans, as discussed earlier.

Experts discuss the freedom of entry and exit into Korea and activities within Korea for Korean-Chinese compatriots due to Korea's serious low birth rate and entry into a highly aging society, but this could lead to the collapse of the Korean labor market. If we acknowledge the failure of Korean-Chinese policies after the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and China, we should turn our attention to North Korean residents. Besides, there are plenty of workers from Central Asia and around the world. The Korean government, which continues to "cry over spilled milk" with failed policies, must reflect. Both colonialism and war are the results of policy failures. Politics only provides sophisticated means to rationalize the massacres of war by using academia, but the general public always seeks a way to survive by gathering together. In other words, they have no choice but to be self-reliant.

In Korea, a multi-ethnic, multicultural society is revealing the human attribute of spontaneously forming and disbanding groups, even without policy changes. As of July 2023, there are 105,671 employment visa (H-2) holders, of which 89,162 (approximately 84%) are Korean-Chinese (Joseonjok). Without a drastic policy change for Korean-Chinese compatriots, who make up the vast majority of employment visa holders, the 'uncomfortable' Joseonjok issue will remain an unsolved problem forever. It is likely that this will be the case.

Everything has a right time to solve the problem. Successive South Korean regimes, which buried the causes and damages of colonialism-liberation-the Korean War, have concealed this with dictatorship and economic development, but makeshift measures that do not solve the root cause may only benefit other victims and vested interests. The uniqueness of Korean history is unprecedented in world history, so it is necessary to have independence in policies. History is the work of determining the continental location of 'that' Manchurian field, and the economy has a value advantage when it knows the past.