단상斷想

Acquittal in the Rebellion Case, Leniency for Oh Se-hoon and Kim Ki-hyun, and the Urgency of Judicial Reform

On October 30, 2026, the 22nd Criminal Division of the Seoul Central District Court (Presiding Judge Jo Hyeong-woo) acquitted People Power Party lawmaker Kim Ki-hyun of charges of violating the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act. Around the same time, Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon had his first-instance conviction overturned and was acquitted in his appeal for violating the Political Funds Act, and eight military personnel involved in the December 3rd emergency martial law were all acquitted of charges of participating in a rebellion. These rulings go beyond the assessment of evidence in individual cases and simultaneously raise structural questions about the standards applied by the judiciary under Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae. While rulings against the Democratic Party and the progressive camp are strict, swift, and severe, rulings concerning the so-called rebellion forces and their periphery are lenient, citing lack of evidence or insufficient credibility of statements. The Kim Ki-hyun case, in particular, most clearly exposes this contradiction.

First, let's look at the rulings concerning military personnel. Eight soldiers, including former 2nd Armored Brigade Commander Gu Sam-hoe and former Ministry of National Defense Innovation Planning Officer Bang Jeong-hwan, who attended the so-called 'Hamburger Meeting' (Lotteria Meeting) and were accused of conspiring in the December 3rd rebellion, were all acquitted in the first instance. The special prosecutor viewed them as discussing the role of a second investigative unit for investigating election fraud or being involved in deploying troops to the National Assembly and the National Election Commission. However, the court ruled that the purpose of disturbing the constitutional order was not recognized and that the characteristics of military organizations, where subordinates obey superiors, should be considered. In fact, with martial law declared and troops moving, they were acquitted on the grounds that they had no specific awareness of their role. This contrasts with past cases, such as the Lee Seok-ki case, where a conviction for incitement to rebellion was confirmed based solely on the content of words. The logic of exoneration due to 'non-recognition of intent,' despite actual troop movements and meetings, has the effect of diluting the responsibility for rebellion from individual actors to the structure and chain of command.

The same was true for Mayor Oh Se-hoon. He was sentenced to a fine of 10 million won (a penalty that would result in the loss of his mayoral position) in the first trial on suspicion of paying for Myung Tae-kyun's public opinion poll, but was acquitted in the second trial. The court gave low credibility to Myung Tae-kyun's testimony and did not acknowledge Mayor Oh's involvement based on newly submitted audio files. The special prosecutor appealed, stating that 'sufficient objective evidence was rejected without reasonable cause.' The difference in judgment between the first and second trials lay in the evaluation of the credibility of the testimony, but as a result, a key politician was exempted from responsibility for charges related to political funds. The Democratic Party criticized it as 'a judgment that defies common sense.'

The Kim Ki-hyun case was not merely a 'gift between spouses.' After being elected as the leader of the People Power Party on March 8, 2023, with the support of Yoon Suk-yeol, his spouse, Lee Sun-ae, handed a Roger Vivier clutch bag (worth about 2.67 million won) to Kim Keon-hee on March 17 of the same month (9 days after his election). The special prosecutor indicted this as a quid pro quo for supporting the party leader election. Half of the bag's purchase cost was paid with gift certificates and department store points, and the rest was paid with a credit card linked to an account where Representative Kim Ki-hyun's parliamentary salary was deposited. This circumstance, confirmed by the special prosecutor, was also recognized by the court as 'suspicious circumstances.' Inside the bag was a memo related to party leader Kim Ki-hyun. The court clearly ruled that the bag was related to the president's comprehensive duties (a position that could exert influence over the ruling party's leader election) and had the nature of a 'repayment' rather than a ceremonial gift. The court even mentioned Yoon Suk-yeol's proposal to change party election rules and his hostile attitude towards rival candidates, acknowledging the job-relatedness.

Nevertheless, Kim Ki-hyun himself was acquitted. The court stated that 'there is no objective evidence directly admitting to conspiracy or delivery, nor is it present in the statements of related parties,' and that the possibility of his wife independently delivering it through employees could not be ruled out. Despite acknowledging the circumstances of payment to a salary account, the timing, memos, and job relevance, the court denied conspiracy due to 'lack of direct evidence.' The special prosecutor sought a one-year prison sentence for Kim Ki-hyun and six months for his spouse, but only his wife was sentenced to a 5 million won fine and confiscation of the bag. Kim Ki-hyun's side claimed 'indiscriminate prosecution' and asserted political oppression. This could be a result of applying the principle of presumption of innocence under the Criminal Procedure Act. However, compared to cases at the same time involving the Democratic Party and progressive factions where statements and circumstantial evidence were evaluated more strictly, and swift guilty verdicts were rendered for election law violations, criticism can inevitably be raised that the standard of strictness is inconsistent.

This ruling is not an isolated incident. It aligns with the immediately preceding acquittal of Oh Se-hoon in the second trial (overturning the first-instance loss of mayoral office due to the rejection of Myung Tae-kyun's testimony credibility) and the acquittal of all eight military personnel (related to the Lotteria meeting and troop deployment, non-recognition of the purpose/intent of disturbing the constitutional order, and consideration of superior-subordinate relations). The trend of exemption for 'lack of specific role recognition' in a situation where martial law was actually declared and troops moved, and the successive exemption of key politicians related to political funds and solicitations, reinforces the impression of 'leniency towards internal rebellion forces and their periphery.' This is the structural background for the widespread perception under Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae's system that the judiciary is strict on one side and lenient on the other. Regardless of the National Court Administration's statement that 'Cho Hee-dae was not involved,' the direction of lower court rulings is directly connected to the overall trust in the judiciary.

These patterns themselves prove why judicial reform must be pursued more strongly and decisively. Issues such as the number and composition of Supreme Court justices, the Chief Justice's nomination power, and problems of trial delays and selective strictness have not fully escaped the shadow of past judicial misconduct. The measures promoted by the Democratic Party, such as increasing the number of Supreme Court justices (from 14 to 26 or more), introducing the crime of judicial distortion, and establishing a system for appealing judicial decisions, are not political attacks but attempts to create checks and balances to prevent the judiciary from repeatedly making politically biased or power-friendly judgments. If the will for reform weakens in a situation where Chief Justice Cho Hee-dae opposes judicial reform as a 'constitutional amendment matter,' prolongs vacancies for Supreme Court justices, and made swift judgments in cases such as the remand of then-presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung's election law case, the judiciary is highly likely to become even more self-protective. The fact that discussions about a parliamentary investigation or impeachment of Cho Hee-dae have already emerged within the Democratic Party is a result of this distrust.

The Democratic Party must express its commitment to judicial reform more clearly and strongly. If the current efforts show hesitation or retreat due to a rush or political calculations, it is no different from condoning judicial bias. Institutional support must be provided for measures such as increasing the number of Supreme Court justices and improving the recommendation process to ensure diversity in the composition of the Supreme Court, establishing a mechanism to review the consistency of judgments between lower and higher courts, ensuring swift and strict trials in cases of rebellion and power-related corruption, improving the judicial evaluation system, and expanding the public disclosure of judgments. If necessary, discussions about parliamentary investigations or impeachment in the National Assembly should not be avoided, and the boundaries of judicial accountability must be clearly defined in conjunction with public opinion. If the judiciary cannot restore trust on its own, the responsibility for that restoration will inevitably fall to the elected power and the people.

The principle of presumption of innocence and the principle of evidence-based trials under the Criminal Procedure Act must be respected. However, if significant differences repeatedly appear across factions in how the same principles are applied, it no longer appears to be 'the application of principles' but rather 'the selective application of principles.' It is difficult to assert the judiciary's fairness when, in the Kim Ki-hyun case, professional relevance and reciprocity were acknowledged, yet he was exonerated, and then Oh Se-hoon and military personnel were successively acquitted. The not-guilty verdicts now being issued are not just individual cases, but the clearest evidence of why the Democratic Party must pursue judicial reform more strongly and decisively. Public judgment can be delivered not only through elections but also through institutional reform and continuous oversight in the National Assembly. If the Cho Hee-dae judiciary cannot resolve this contradiction itself, the responsibility will also fall on the political forces that hesitated to reform.