단상斷想

The traditional media seized on the president's SNS communication numbers—'116 times in September alone'—and framed it as 'excessive communication, micromanagement, catering to supporters,' and 'concerns from some within the ruling party,' pushing the narrative beyond facts into a realm of interpretive controversy. When Moon Jae-in pursued secretive policies without communicating, there was no word, but it's obvious they'll criticize if he communicates and criticize if he doesn't, so communicating is the right thing to do. Given the president's nature, it's very exciting for the public to have a president who directly checks what the people are thinking and what they want, rather than asking the Senior Secretary for Civil Affairs.

However, this narrative of dissatisfaction, repeated by legacy media including [Sisa Fact Plus], is not simple. It is an attitude that is uncomfortable with the president's direct communication with the public, and at the same time, it is a deliberate downplaying and collaborative public opinion campaign against the president's chosen communication method in a situation where obstruction from hardliners within the party and persistent media attempts to undermine the president are occurring simultaneously.

Behind this downplaying lies the inertia of a structure that has long conditioned the public to be passive consumers of information. To tame Lee Jae-myung, a man who doesn't listen to them, they want to maintain a distance between voters and the president, under the guise of 'dignity,' creating space for silence and for themselves to mediate, thereby sustaining their livelihoods. Those who only talk about dignity are, in fact, the main culprits of a low-quality public opinion environment. We only need to reflect on how backward the public's political awareness has become over the past few decades, thanks to the survival of Kim Eo-jun, Yoo Si-min, and Joo Jin-woo.

On September 30, President Lee Jae-myung clearly stated in his post, 'SNS is a direct communication channel between me and the public.' The part where he said, 'When all media vested interests came forward to isolate me, distort facts, slander me with false information, and attack me, it was SNS that connected me with the public, informed them of the truth, and led me to where I am today,' is not just an excuse but is deeply connected to his experience of political survival.

The experience of direct communication being the only channel amidst repeated selective reporting and distortion since his time as Seongnam mayor is forcing the same choice in the current situation, where approval ratings are falling and internal conflicts are overlapping. The number 116 is an extension of that. From the purpose of prosecutorial reform, the direction of real estate normalization, the specific content of policy achievements, and sometimes even expressing positions on internal debates, it differs from the summaries presented by the media after cutting and reinterpreting them. While there is a risk in delivering the original text as is, the choice to directly show it to the public, even at that risk, is a fundamental stance as a representative of the sovereign people.

However, two barriers simultaneously exist before this choice. One is the persistent framing of legacy media. They define the president's direct communication as 'SNS addiction' or 'confrontational politics,' emphasizing frequency over content and rough expression over achievements. The view that criticizes a single expression like '좌아하게' (roughly, 'bluntly' or 'crudely') as 'only caring about the supporters' is a typical example. The attitude of being uncomfortable with the public directly encountering and judging diverse language and contexts is no different from viewing the public as immature. If we look back at how anti-national actors lived 'elegantly' for 81 years since liberation, it might be difficult to dare criticize '좌아하게,' but we need to reflect on whether we ourselves, accustomed to third-rate public opinion, are failing to think critically.

The longer that gaze persists, the lower the political dignity of the people becomes. This is because opportunities to read, compare, and refute directly are diminished. The business model and power structure of legacy media rely on gatekeeping. In a system where information reaches the public only after being filtered and processed, if the president bypasses that process, their raison d'être weakens. For decades, the Korean media has functioned either as a propaganda tool for the regime or, conversely, as a weapon to attack it, repeatedly adopting the attitude of 'it's complicated, so we'll sort it out for you.' The result is not the active judgment ability of sovereign citizens, but the habit of consumers accustomed to sensational and simplified frames. The current 'killing of the president' is an extension of that habit. Attributing the cause of declining approval ratings not to policy shortcomings or external factors, but to the president's 'excessive remarks,' reflects an attitude that the public cannot tolerate encountering the original text itself.

Another barrier is the obstruction by hardliners within the party. Internal debates surrounding prosecutorial reform, appointments, and the reform agenda are not merely policy differences. Public criticism from some figures, including Yoo Si-min, the controversy over the appointment of the head of the Central Investigation Agency, and the emotional conflicts within the camp revealed in the process, continuously shake the president's state administration. Whenever the pace or direction of reform differs from their expectations, hardliners publicly raise issues, providing material for the media to amplify and reproduce the conflict. The president's direct response to internal debates on social media can be interpreted as an attempt to deliver messages without distortion amidst such obstruction. However, legacy media frames this attempt as 'communication bogged down in internal factional infighting.' When the obstruction of hardliners meets the media's framing, the president's direct communication is attacked on two fronts. On one side, they criticize 'inability to manage internal affairs,' and on the other, they criticize 'only caring about the support base.' Caught in between, the public loses the opportunity to judge between the original text and the processed version.

In this double bind, the president's struggle to communicate directly with the people is regrettable. In a situation where approval ratings are falling and internal conflicts are becoming public, having to simultaneously deal with the distortion of the media establishment and the obstruction of hardliners is by no means comfortable. The president's statement that “the more difficult it is, the more severe the distorted attacks, the more I must communicate directly with the people” is a result of his own recognition of that regret. The number 116 is a product of that recognition. The frequency itself cannot be a problem. There are cases where leaders of major countries post more, and what is important is the content.

A significant portion of the September posts consists of policy promotion, explanations of current issues, and direct refutations of distortions. To reduce this to addiction or a fight reveals the limitations of the media, which cannot distinguish between the president's act of explaining state affairs and a war of public opinion. Some concerns within the ruling party are similar. While it may be uncomfortable to publicly address internal debates, that does not necessarily mean a failure of state affairs. Rather, it should be remembered that the method of making decisions in closed-door meetings and then unilaterally conveying them through the media has created greater distrust.

Dignity, in the end, is a matter of whom it is directed at. Authoritarian dignity considers keeping a distance, speaking sparingly, and managing the public from a certain distance as virtues. Democratic dignity is different. It includes the attitude of providing information to the sovereign as close to the original text as possible, and enduring the noise and debate that arise in the process. The method chosen by President Lee Jae-myung is closer to the latter. Of course, that method also has its limitations. The background of the author of the quoted text may become controversial, or the expression may seem rough. However, the demand to reduce direct communication itself due to these limitations is, in the end, the logic of traditional media saying, 'we will filter it for you again.' Every time that logic is repeated, the public loses the opportunity to judge between the original and the processed version, and consumes politics as a story arranged by others. That is the starting point of an undignified political environment.

In a situation where obstruction from hardliners within the party and the legacy media's attempts to undermine the president are occurring simultaneously, the president's attempt to communicate directly with the public is a regrettable struggle. Reporting that labels this struggle as 'excessive' or 'a decline in dignity' is merely the meddling of a system that has made the public low-quality consumers. The concerns reiterated by narratives like Sisa Fact Plus are therefore not new. They are the reactions of a system that has long confined the public to the role of information consumers, reacting whenever that system is shaken. How many posts the president makes in a day is secondary.

The more important questions are whether those posts exist in a form that the public can read and judge directly, and how much the media and internal party forces respect that space for judgment. If traditional media wants to talk about dignity, they must first reflect on the low-quality information environment they have created and the way they use that environment to attack the president. Otherwise, the number 116 will remain an uncomfortable number. The responsibility for that discomfort lies more with those who cannot tolerate the public directly encountering those posts, rather than with the person who posted them. In a situation where obstruction from hardliners and media attacks overlap, the attempt not to give up direct communication with the public is regrettable, but that very regret might be the minimum condition for democratic dignity.