단상斷想

Looking back at the media landscape of modern Korean history, the power structure of the 'media-political complex' created by collusion between politics and the media has constantly changed its form and dominated society. The origin of this is, of course, the Chosun Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, and Dong-A Ilbo as pro-Japanese media, that is, 'Chojoongdong'. They combined their pro-Japanese careers during the Japanese colonial period with anti-communist and conservative ideologies after liberation, and accumulated media power under the umbrella of power until the military and civilian governments. In particular, the Chosun Ilbo showed a pro-Japanese tone at the end of the Japanese colonial period after its foundation in 1920, and survived through collusion with the Syngman Rhee regime after liberation. The JoongAng Ilbo was sponsored by the Park Chung-hee regime from its foundation in 1965, and the Dong-A Ilbo also established a cooperative relationship with the military regime after the 1960s. Through a honeymoon relationship with political power, they were deeply involved in the policy-making process under the pretext of leading public opinion, and took on the role of aggressive reporting to powers unfavorable to them and shields for favorable powers. This went beyond simple political bias of the media, and the media and political circles structurally combined to maintain a systemic power relationship to control the discourse of society as a whole.

After the May 16 military coup in 1961, the media was virtually incorporated into the state power. The 'media consolidation' and 'reporting guidelines' of the 1970s completely eradicated the autonomy of the press, and the conservative media structure centered on Chosun, Dong-A, and JoongAng was solidified. During this period, the media-political complex was a propaganda and agitation tool of the regime, concealing and distorting unfavorable events and amplifying and reproducing favorable information. In the economic growth process of the 1960s and 1980s, JoJoongDong justified the authoritarian regime through the ideological frame of 'anti-communist development theory'. They continued to spread the logic that economic growth was a priority over democracy, and defined labor movements and student movements as 'impure forces that hinder economic growth'. In particular, during the Three Lows boom in the 1980s, while uncritically promoting the government's economic policies, they ignored the side effects of real estate speculation and widening wage gaps.

Since the 1990s, their absolute power has been partially weakened due to democratization and the emergence of the Internet, but the structure of the media-political complex itself has not collapsed. Rather, the new media environment of Internet portals and SNS laid the foundation for the rise of a different type of complex. Alternative media and disruptive media figures filled the void left by the reduced dominance of traditional conservative media. During the Lee Myung-bak administration, the conservative power attempted to seize control of public broadcasting again, and the media environment gradually shifted to an online focus. However, the Sewol ferry disaster coverage distortion and bias controversy greatly damaged the trust in traditional media, and instead, podcasts, SNS, and YouTube became the core stage for political opinion formation.

Kim Eo-jun emerged as a prominent figure in this process. While distancing himself from the frames of traditional media, Kim Eo-jun possesses political influence no less than any traditional journalist. He prioritized 'agenda setting' and 'frame warfare' over 'fact delivery,' and disseminated these in real-time through multi-channel platforms such as radio, podcasts, and YouTube. While existing media indirectly shaped public opinion through articles, Kim Eo-jun employed a direct and emotional persuasion method based on fandom and networks. Unlike traditional media, his media has few restrictions from affiliated organizations or internal editorial control, creating a structure where his statements immediately lead to political repercussions.

Analyzing the characteristics of one-person media, represented by Kim Eo-jun, the first is the 'absoluteness of personal brand'. In traditional media, the brand of a newspaper or broadcasting company was more important than individual reporters or anchors, but in one-person media, the individual's character and credibility determine everything. Second, it is 'directness and immediacy'. An individual's judgment and interpretation become content immediately, without the verification process of the editorial department. Third, it is 'maximization of two-way communication'. It interacts with recipients in real time through comments, chats, sponsorships, etc., and forms a loyal fan base. These characteristics enable one-person media to have much stronger political mobilization power than traditional media. However, at the same time, there is also the problem that it is quite free from the basic principles of journalism such as fact-checking and balanced reporting.

Entering the 2020s, the Korean media landscape has become completely polarized. The conservative camp is still centered around Chojoongdong, while the progressive camp is centered around one-person media and alternative media represented by Kim Eo-jun. However, this structure is fragmenting the public sphere rather than deepening it. Both camps define each other as 'fake news' and build a closed public opinion ecosystem, and the people live in a parallel truth system where they perceive the same event as a completely different reality.

In this process, the media-political complex of Korean society was reorganized within the dichotomy of conservative vs. progressive, old media vs. new media. While JoongAng Ilbo, Chosun Ilbo, and Dong-A Ilbo still hold the hegemony of the conservative camp, Kim Eo-jun wields almost exclusive influence in the progressive camp, blurring the boundaries between media and politics. The problem is that this structure works in a direction that reinforces polarization, rather than deepening the 'healthy public sphere' of democracy.

First, when the media becomes politicized, political goals take precedence over the delivery of facts. This goes beyond 'biased reporting' and creates a parallel truth system that makes people perceive the same issue as completely different realities. Chojoongdong and Kim Eo-jun's camp define each other as 'fake news' to rally their supporters, and as a result, the public sphere is cut off and dialogue becomes impossible.

Second, the influence of these complexes directly pressures politicians' agenda setting. Politicians must manage their relationship with the complex, even to avoid being swayed by the media's frame, and even focus on 'media exposure' strategies rather than policies to avoid criticism. As a result, political decision-making is distorted, becoming subordinate to the 'interests of the opinion-leading forces' rather than the 'interests of the entire people.'

Third, the impact on individual citizens is also significant. The media-political complex not only changes news consumption patterns, but also solidifies political identity itself. Subscribers of Chojoongdong tend to be trapped in a conservative mindset, and listeners of Kim Eo-jun tend to be trapped in a progressive mindset, creating a structure where 'political immigration' is almost impossible.

In the end, the evolution of the media-politics complex, stretching from JoongJoongDong to Kim Eo-jun, is the same in essence, only different in form. It is the politicization of the media and the subordination of politics to the media. In order for democracy to be alive, the media must monitor power and provide balanced information to citizens, but in reality in Korea, the media often functions as part of a specific political force. The task that 21st century Korean society must solve is not 'winning' either conservatives or progressives, but the media becoming independent from politics, and citizens recovering the ability to make autonomous judgments beyond the framework of the media-politics complex. Otherwise, we will continue to repeat the vicious cycle of democracy, swayed by the influence of the complex with a new face each time it appears.