단상斷想

An opinion poll released on the 11th showed that President Lee Jae-myung's approval rating for his performance in state affairs fell to the 50% range for the first time in six weeks, recording the lowest level. This is the first time since his inauguration. Although it is only a single survey, the political world never takes the signal of 'first decline' lightly. The President's Office may try to brush it off by saying, "We don't get overly excited or discouraged by approval ratings," but we would like to examine the trend and cause of the decline, as the upward stability that has continued since President Lee's inauguration has been broken.

In fact, it cannot be said that the political barometer is fully reflected only by the public opinion poll regularly announced every Monday by a company called Realmeter. There is also a criticism that 'it is not a reliable indicator in terms of objectivity of data and survey methods.' Nevertheless, some political implications can be found in Realmeter's regular announcement of public opinion polls every week.

First, when the 'inertial flow' of public opinion continues and the first inflection point appears, it can be a signal of future trend changes. A feature of the Realmeter weekly survey is that it is not a 'single point' but continuous data released every week.

Political experts do not take the inflection point of the first emerging trend lightly. This is because whether it will "solidify into a trend" is determined within the next 2-3 weeks. In addition, Realmeter has the symbolism of being the 'first runner' of the signal, even though it is a single survey.

If an inflection point is captured in the weekly trend, the same trend is likely to be reconfirmed in other surveys later. In this regard, the fact that an inflection point has appeared this week that the rising stability of President Lee Jae-myung's approval rating may be broken is not a matter that the President's Office should take lightly.

In addition, the weekly Realmeter figures are a kind of 'baseline data' that everyone in power checks every week in internal briefings. When the first decline like this occurs, the Blue House and the ruling party's strategy team immediately activate a 'diagnosis of the cause of the decline - response scenario.' In particular, politicians tend to be more sensitive to the change from the previous week than to the absolute figures. In this respect, the Realmeter announcement has an unusual political meaning.

In particular, the political sphere pays more attention to ‘who first raised the crisis theory’ as a starting point for change, rather than the reliability of opinion polls. If the media catches and latches onto the flow of that first inflection point, it directly connects to agenda or narrative leadership. This is the time when the President's Office needs to respond proactively in political affairs.

In addition, the Realmeter results are one of the most frequently cited weekly opinion polls in other media, broadcasting, and YouTube channels. This means that once a figure is released, it is not just simple data, but it is repeatedly reported for several days, reproduced in an expanded form, and it has the effect of being imprinted as if it were ‘political reality.’ Depending on how it is perceived by the ‘information consumer’ rather than the accuracy of the actual figures, it creates a more powerful political oversight effect than the importance of the issue.

In political analysis, the secondary effect of an indicator as an 'interpretive material' often looms larger than the 'fact' of the indicator itself. The fact that President Lee's approval rating fell to the 50% range for the first time is, in a way, just a 'numerical meaning' that appears when viewed in the long-term phase of rising and falling. However, even if the decline is not significant, the title of 'first fall' leaves much room for 'interpretations that put the brakes' on the President's reform drive. Rather than a cold interpretation of exaggerating the numbers, the practice of 'interpretation becoming a weapon' even in a single survey can be said to be a limitation and disadvantage of the agenda-forming process of Korean politics.

In any case, President Lee Jae-myung's approval rating has fallen below 50% for the first time since taking office, and its upward trend has been broken. What's more ominous than the drop itself is the 'pattern'. There may be several reasons why President Lee's approval rating showed its first inflection point of decline since taking office.

First, the loss of agenda leadership. Looking at the approval rating pattern since President Lee Jae-myung took office, it shows that it rose when he led the issue with personnel and reforms, and tended to fall when he was deprived of the issue and dragged into exogenous variables.

The recent decline in approval ratings stemmed from exogenous variables rather than the president's own mistakes. Allegations of Lee Chun-seok's nominee stock trading and the controversy over the pardon of Cho Kuk and Yoon Mi-hyang are either external, unexpected accidents or controversies triggered by political pressure. In politics, issue leadership functions as both an offensive weapon and a shield.

When the presidential office leads reform issues, approval ratings are on the rise and stable, but if that leadership is taken away by exogenous variables, an unfair situation arises where the president bears the political responsibility. This decline is a case where that pattern has been reproduced intact. It is impossible to infinitely produce reform issues, but it is important to establish a long-term roadmap and continuously throw out reform issues.

Second, there is confusion and conflict over the party's internal power leadership. The Democratic Party's national convention was supposed to be Lee Jae-myung's stage, but some interpret it as Representative Park Chan-dae not being able to exert his power enough to warrant the assessment that "Kim Eo-jun won." Party leader Chung Cheong-rae's presence itself becomes a variable.

If the leadership of reform is handed over to the party leader, a 'distorted power structure' is created where Chung Cheong-rae does the work and the president takes the responsibility. Chung Cheong-rae secured the justification to run for the next term with the party members' opinions, and the driving force of his own politics is bound to be beyond the control of the presidential office. Because this structure can make Lee Jae-myung's presidential office a 'dependent variable of the party,' political management that proactively takes the party-government relationship is absolutely necessary.

Third, managing the opinions of the moderate class. This decline is not due to the change of heart of the fixed supporters, but rather the departure of the moderate and floating classes. If the reform narrative is only consumed as a battle between camps, the moderate class will fall into conflict fatigue, and the moment the feeling of livelihood achievement is delayed, the moderate class will leave, and the core supporters will be shaken by the aftermath. No matter how desperate the reform is, the moderate class can turn away at any time if it cannot fill the emptiness of people's livelihood.

Ultimately, this drop in President Lee's approval rating is the result of the 'loss of the three-piece set of leadership'. It is about continuously producing agendas for constant reform that are not shaken by exogenous variables, resetting the power structure with the party leader to take the lead in the relationship with the party, and taking the lead in public opinion with a narrative that balances reform and the people's livelihood. Whether this drop in approval rating will be a simple adjustment phase or a signal of a downward trend depends on how the aforementioned three types of leadership are restored and sustained.

The drop in approval ratings also signifies the end of President Lee Jae-myung's 'short' honeymoon period at the beginning of his term. This is interpreted as a signal flare demanding reflection and introspection on the initial state administration by the government and the ruling party, rather than a simple fluctuation in public opinion.

Even for a moment, turning your back on public sentiment or falling into arrogance and self-righteousness, approval ratings are like a handful of sand that quickly slips out of your palm. There is no other way but to constantly communicate with the people and continue to finely adjust the zero point of state administration towards the point that public opinion is aiming at. In this respect, Lee Chun-seok and Cho Kuk are stray bullets that are far from Lee Jae-myung's zero-point adjustment.