단상斷想

Looking at the 'final years' of the Joseon Dynasty, I can't help but feel a sense of bitterness and regret. In reality, the Joseon Dynasty should be seen as having reached the end of its lifespan with King Jeongjo. The year 1800, when King Sunjo ascended the throne after Jeongjo's death, can be considered the first year of the Joseon Dynasty's demise. Watching the Joseon Dynasty slowly wither and die offers many lessons for modern politics.

The survival of a nation shows vastly different histories of rise and fall depending on factors such as strong leadership, institutional stability, economic sustainability, social cohesion, and the ability to respond to external threats. Charles Tilly emphasized the importance of centralized power, while Douglass North emphasized institutional efficiency. In addition, Edmund Burke saw social trust as important, and Joseph Nye saw diplomatic flexibility as important. If even one of these elements goes wrong or collapses, the remaining elements will collapse in an instant like dominoes.

When Joseon fell (1910), looking back at the previous 100 years, one can witness the conditions for the survival of the nation collapsing one by one in a miserable way. The last five kings of Joseon (Sunjo, Heonjong, Cheoljong, Gojong, Sunjong) gradually eroded the conditions for national survival one by one, and eventually, with the insignificant Sunjong, the lineage was completely cut off.

The 'extinction' of the last five kings of Joseon is similar to the collapse of the Yoon Seok-yeol regime in 2025. Although it may be unreasonable to directly compare the Joseon Dynasty and the Yoon Seok-yeol regime due to differences in power structures such as the dynasty and the presidential system, the historical situation and external environment at the time, and the temporal distance, commonalities can also be drawn in terms of the 'primitive survival instinct' of power and the life and death of the nation.

In fact, even during King Jeongjo's reign, there was a glimmer of hope that Joseon's prosperity could be ensured depending on what his successors did. Ultimately, Jeongjo (1752-1800) became the last king of Joseon to fulfill the conditions for the nation's survival.

Jeongjo revitalized the economy with Sinhae Tonggong (1791) and integrated politics with the Tangpyeong policy. Gyujanggak increased institutional efficiency as a policy think tank, and Suwon Hwaseong Fortress (1794-1796) was an effective 'rear base' for consolidating military and economic foundations. Reforming the Samjeong Disorder stabilized public sentiment, and balanced diplomacy with the Qing Dynasty protected independence. All of these political achievements of Jeongjo are worthy of being recorded as the achievements of a wise ruler that meet the conditions for the survival of the nation.

However, with King Jeongjo's 'passing,' Joseon's strength rapidly declined. I have always wondered why Joseon suddenly showed such a 'spasmodic decline of power' after King Jeongjo. Why were the solid fabrics of national survival that Jeongjo had achieved torn to shreds overnight?

I believe the fundamental reason is that abnormal powers, which had been eyeing the vacancy as the authority of the king and the state collapsed, eventually devoured the Joseon Dynasty. This is none other than the Seodo politics. The Seodo politicians' abuse of power eroded the leadership, institutional stability, economic sustainability, social cohesion, and the ability to respond to external threats, which are the conditions for national survival, one by one, while maintaining their handful of power. The fact that the Seodo politicians thought of their families before the country is similar to the situation today where Yoon Seok-yeol thinks of his spouse before the country.

Sedo politics refers to a system in which specific families, including the Andong Kim clan, excluded the royal family, monopolized power, and manipulated state affairs. This undermined King Jeongjo's centralized leadership and institutional balance (Tangpyeong policy, Kyujanggak) and even paralyzed the core functions of the state.

The biggest problem with Sedo politics was that the state's decision-making structure was not a 'consultation' system with vassals centered on the king, but rather prioritized the impromptu and partisan interests of a few powerful figures. During the reign of Sunjo (ascended the throne at age 11, 1800-1834), Kim Jo-sun of the Andong Kim clan took control of the court as Sunjo's father-in-law. The Kim family privatized power through marriage ties and bureaucratic appointments, neutralizing King Jeongjo's Tangpyeong policy.

In particular, the Sinyu Persecution (1801) was ostensibly aimed at suppressing Catholicism, but it was a political 'coup' used by the Andong Kim clan to purge opposing forces such as the Namin. The Hong Gyeong-rae Rebellion (1811) was an explosion of popular discontent due to the corruption of the three administrations, but the Andong Kim clan responded to it only with military suppression instead of stabilizing people's livelihood. This undermined economic sustainability and social cohesion.

The political power of King Heonjong (ascended to the throne at the age of 8, 1834~1849) was also neutralized in the power struggle between the Andong Kim clan and the Jo clan in-laws (Jo Man-yeong). The Seodo politics monopolized state affairs by excluding the royal family and dividing power. At this time, the Gihae Persecution (1839) and famine occurred, but they were engrossed in pursuing private interests while destroying people's livelihood.

During the reign of King Cheoljong (ascended to the throne at age 19, 1849~1863), nepotism was at its peak. Before becoming king, Cheoljong was a 'Ganghwa Island bachelor' who spent his childhood as a woodcutter on Ganghwa Island. He was a puppet placed on the throne by the Andong Kim clan. The Kim family completely seized control of the central and local governments, privatizing state affairs. The Jinju Uprising (1862), which occurred at this time, caused public anger to explode. The Andong Kim clan suppressed the uprising by force, ignoring the public sentiment, which symbolized the collapse of social cohesion.

After that, Gojong (ascended the throne at age 12, 1863~1907), who is most familiar to us, ascends the throne. Gojong was the worst incompetent king who was constantly plagued by a 'triple attack' from not only his in-laws (Empress Myeongseong) but also his father Heungseon Daewongun and the remaining forces of the Andong Kim clan, and eventually handed the country over to Japan.

During the Imo Incident (1882), the corruption of the Seodo politics and military dissatisfaction exploded, but Gojong failed to resolve this and requested the intervention of the Qing Dynasty, providing a decisive cause for Japan to swallow Joseon. With the Donghak Peasant Revolution (1894), Gojong's authority was completely lost, and the reforms (Gabo Reform) that he attempted were frustrated by foreign interference and internal power struggles.

Sunjong (33 years old, 1907~1910), the last king of Joseon, was a nominal existence whose name only remained after the country was handed over to Japan. He was a king in name only under Japanese control. The Andong Kim clan's Seodo politics colluded with the Japanese, completely manipulating state affairs, and were ultimately the main culprits who thoroughly ruined the country.

The Seodo politics paralyzed all functions of the state, and in 1910, Joseon was finally forcibly annexed by Japan, and the dynasty had to close its doors. In the process of European royal families establishing a new 'nation' after the country collapsed, there are often cases where the former royal families are re-established and a constitutional monarchy is adopted, even in name only, but the people of Joseon were fed up with the incompetence of the last five kings after King Jeongjo and did not even look at the royal family.

The last five kings who hastened the decline of Joseon were unable to exercise proper 'royal authority' due to the impregnable wall of Sedo politics and were just struggling to survive. In this process, the young age of Sunjo, Heonjong, and Gojong, and the lack of political experience of Cheoljong and Sunjong were decisive reasons for Sedo politics to seize power.

However, the lack of age or political power is just a cowardly excuse. It may be a condition that enabled the state affairs manipulation of Sedo politics, but it is not the core reason that hastened the fall of Joseon. Any country can face a crisis. The prosperity and survival of a country can completely change depending on how much 'resilience' it has and whether it has the ability to respond to crises when its 'national structure' is in a total crisis.

If there had been no abuse of power by the SeDo government, the weakening of the royal family or external pressure could have been sufficiently dealt with by King Jeongjo's system politics (Kyujanggak, Tangpyeong policy, Hwaseong). In the end, the state affairs manipulation of the abnormal power called SeDo politics shattered the 518-year (1392~1910) dynasty.

It has only been 3 years since Yoon Seok-yeol took power. It took exactly 110 years for Joseon to fall, from Sunjo's enthronement in 1800 to Sunjong in 1910, but if Yoon Seok-yeol had been in power for 5 years, there is a high possibility that the Republic of Korea would have hastened the collapse of the nation equivalent to the collapse of Joseon.

The Yoon Suk-yeol regime is a case where the national system has completely collapsed as a modern-day SeDo (powerful in-law family) political force called Kim Keon-hee abnormally intervenes in state affairs. The various suspicions and corruption surrounding Kim Keon-hee were a department store of corruption comparable to the bribery and corruption of the Andong Kim clan. Just as the Andong Kim clan's powerful families ousted the king and monopolized personnel matters, Kim Keon-hee mobilized the "First Lady Line" to plant her people in key positions, manipulate state affairs, and privatize power.

If the Yoon Suk-yeol regime had continued for five years, who could guarantee that the nation's system would not have reached the level it was just before the fall of the Joseon Dynasty? The national rankings in the global village are changing so rapidly that the past 100 years are equivalent to the current 10 years. Fortunately, Yoon Suk-yeol's abnormal abuse of power barely stopped in his third year due to his own 'self-harm politics'.

In this regard, President Lee Jae-myung's 'national system restoration' project is not just a simple state reform, but a task of re-establishing the collapsed constitutional order (Joseon monarchy), and is even more important in that it is a modern reconstruction of the system state that King Jeongjo attempted. Will President Lee Jae-myung be able to restore the national system that King Jeongjo left behind: policy (Kyujanggak), politics of integration (Tangpyeong policy), and crisis response base (Suwon Hwaseong)?