단상斷想

In modern Korean society, the crisis faced by young people is not simply a personal problem, but a phenomenon that comprehensively reveals structural contradictions in society. The high suicide rate and the departure to the far-right tendencies of young people appear to be different phenomena, but fundamentally, they are two extreme response methods derived from the same social pathology. It is no coincidence that the suicide rate of Korean youth is 23.0, 2.1 times higher than the OECD average, and at the same time, the far-right tendency in their 20s is 28%. This is clear evidence that the structural contradictions of modern Korean society are forcing young people to make extreme choices.

The crisis experienced by the Korean youth stems from a severe gap between the cultural goals presented by society and the institutional means to achieve them. Social expectations such as entering a good university, securing stable employment, and achieving economic success remain strong, but the continuous increase in youth unemployment, the spread of precarious work, and housing problems caused by soaring real estate prices make achieving these goals extremely difficult. In this situation of structural constraints, young people choose extreme forms among the various adaptation types presented by Merton. Some choose suicide as an extreme form of 'giving up,' completely withdrawing from society. On the other hand, others, in the form of 'rebellion,' completely deny the existing social order and pursue new goals and means through far-right ideologies. Radicalized young people define the existing social system as 'corrupt and incompetent' and are attracted to extreme political forces that propose social reorganization through strong authority and exclusive nationalism as an alternative.

The rapid disintegration of social support networks that were traditionally provided by family, local communities, and workplaces in Korean society is driving young people into severe social isolation. In particular, the three years of social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic have further depleted already weakened social capital. This social isolation leads young people to seek extreme forms of social solidarity in online spaces. Young people who choose suicide try to 'solve' their sense of isolation through complete social disconnection, while young people who become far-right try to restore their sense of belonging through exclusive and hostile forms of social solidarity. Far-right online communities provide a strong sense of identity and belonging to young people alienated from mainstream society. Here, young people reinterpret their socio-economic difficulties as damage caused by 'external enemies' (immigrants, feminists, leftists, etc.) rather than personal failures, and try to restore their damaged self-esteem through this.

Relative deprivation is a key factor in understanding the extreme responses of Korean youth. The economic success and social mobility experienced by the parent generation act as a reference group for young people, increasing their relative deprivation. However, responses to this sense of deprivation appear in two contrasting forms. Young people who choose suicide internalize relative deprivation, leading to self-destructive behavior, while young people who become far-right externalize it, expressing it as aggressive hostility towards society. Far-right ideology provides a clear and simple answer to the relative deprivation of young people. By reducing complex socioeconomic structural problems to hostility towards specific groups, it provides young people with the comfort that their difficulties are not due to personal failure but to the 'conspiracy of enemies'.

As the stability and predictability provided by traditional social systems disappear, young people are placed in a situation where they have to bear all the risks and uncertainties individually. This excessive individualization leads young people to seek extreme individual solutions rather than social solutions. Suicide is the most extreme personal solution to escape the burden of individualized responsibility. On the other hand, far-right ideology offers another extreme solution: transforming individualized anxiety into collective identity. The far-right worldview sublimates individualized anxiety into collective hostility by reorganizing and presenting complex and uncertain modern society into a simple and dichotomous structure. Through this, young people reinterpret their personal failures and frustrations in the context of social struggle.

The possibility of deviant behavior increases when the bonds connecting individuals and society weaken. In the case of Korean youth, the traditional elements of social bonding – attachment, commitment, participation, and belief – are all weakening. This weakening of social bonds alienates young people from the existing social order and weakens the social restraint against extreme behavior. Suicide and far-right extremism both represent a rejection of the existing social order, but their directions are diametrically opposed. Suicide is a passive resistance through complete severance of social bonds, while far-right extremism is an active resistance aimed at subverting the existing social order. Both phenomena are pathological phenomena that occur when normal social control mechanisms are not functioning properly.

The extreme responses of modern young people are closely related to the development of digital technology. Online spaces act as a mechanism for amplifying extreme thoughts and behaviors. As information and methods about suicide become easily accessible online, the contagiousness of suicide is increasing. At the same time, far-right ideologies are also spreading rapidly through online platforms. In particular, algorithm-based content recommendation systems create an "echo chamber" effect that reinforces extreme thinking by continuously exposing users to content of similar tendencies. Young people with suicidal impulses are continuously exposed to pessimistic and hopeless content, justifying extreme choices, and young people with far-right tendencies are continuously exposed to content that incites hatred and anger, further strengthening their extreme political tendencies.

The deepening economic inequality in Korean society is a key factor driving extreme responses from young people. The widening income inequality and the deepening asset gap lead young people to question the fundamental social system. However, in the process of finding answers to these questions, young people reach different extreme conclusions. Some young people decide that they cannot personally overcome the unequal social structure and fall into despair, choosing suicide. On the other hand, other young people are attracted to far-right solutions, interpreting the cause of inequality as 'privileges' or 'reverse discrimination' of specific groups. Far-right ideology reduces the complex problem of economic inequality to a simple conflict between groups, providing young people with an easy and intuitive explanation for their economic difficulties.

According to a recent survey, 28% of young people in their 20s showed far-right tendencies, with the proportion of men with far-right tendencies being 24%, higher than 19% of women. This gender gap shows that gender conflict in Korean society is becoming politically extreme. In particular, in the case of young men, there are many cases in which they form far-right political tendencies by recognizing the spread of feminism and the expansion of women's policies as 'reverse discrimination'. On the other hand, young women experience other forms of despair as they are still exposed to gender discrimination and the risk of sexual violence. The increase in the suicide rate among young women can be interpreted as a phenomenon in which conflicts and stress arising from changes in the gender power structure are individualized. The politicization of gender conflict is dividing solidarity within the youth, making it difficult to find collective solutions.

Korea's education system is still based on the values and goals of the industrial era, but the labor market that young people enter has already changed to a post-industrial, digitalized environment. This gap between education and reality causes deep confusion and frustration for young people. The reality that academic qualifications and certifications acquired through fierce competition are not recognized as valuable as expected in actual society seriously damages the self-identity of young people. These contradictions in the education system make young people distrust the entire existing social order. Young people who choose suicide internalize this distrust and lead to self-destruction, while young people who become far-right project it externally and express it as hostility towards existing elite groups. The far-right ideology defines existing educational elites and intellectual groups as 'vested interests' and politically mobilizes young people's grievances against them.

The suicide and far-right phenomena among Korean youth are both pathological phenomena stemming from the same socio-structural contradictions. Therefore, solving these two problems is only possible through a comprehensive and structural approach, not an individual one. Strengthening the social safety net, improving youth employment stability, reforming the education system, resolving economic inequality, and expanding community programs to build social capital are necessary. What is particularly important is a shift in perspective that recognizes young people's extreme choices as a social responsibility, rather than attributing them to individual failure or deviance. Young people's despair and anger are legitimate social signals, and a social response to them is needed. The fundamental solution is not simply to suppress extreme behavior, but to eliminate the socio-structural causes that trigger it.

The suicide rate is an indicator of the health of a society. Likewise, the far-right phenomenon among young people should be understood as an indicator reflecting the pathological state of society. High youth suicide rates and the spread of far-right tendencies are both signs of structural problems throughout Korean society. Therefore, solving these problems is only possible through healing the whole society, not treating or correcting individual young people. Creating a society where young people do not despair and do not make extreme choices, a society where young people can participate in society and politics in a healthy way, is the real solution. This is not just for the younger generation, but an essential task for the sustainable development of Korean society as a whole.