단상斷想

From public office to chaebol, and back to power….

In Korean society, high-ranking public officials or bureaucrats are not merely figures who led the administration and policies of an era, but also continue to play a role as a link between power and capital even after retirement. It is no longer unusual for those who were at the core of key national power organizations, such as ministers and vice ministers, presidential secretaries, high-ranking prosecutors and police officers, and executives of the National Tax Service and the Financial Supervisory Service, to move to large corporations as advisors or to large law firms as senior advisors upon retirement. This creates a structural problem of privately transferring influence from public office under the name of so-called 'preferential treatment for former officials'.

They play a role in bringing enormous profits to the private sector based on their personal connections, highly confidential information, and understanding of policy decision-making structures accumulated while in public office. In particular, law firms and large corporations recruit them not simply to obtain advice, but as a strategic move to secure 'unofficial channels' within the executive and judicial branches. In this process, public authority is reduced to a means for private gain, leading to a result that undermines the credibility of the national system.

A League of the Privileged, an Invisible Power Exchange

Representative examples include former high-ranking prosecutors joining large law firms after retirement and taking on investigation-related cases, effectively inducing "lenient investigations," or high-ranking officials from the National Tax Service providing tax advice to large corporations, contributing to tax evasion. Furthermore, the phenomenon of former Financial Supervisory Service executives joining large corporations' financial affiliates as advisors and neutralizing internal oversight functions is also frequently observed. More serious is that they are not only involved in individual cases but also exert influence from the policy-making stage. In the process of discussing deregulation or policy changes, former high-ranking officials provide information through private channels and sometimes engage in lobbying activities that influence the policy direction itself. This structure forms a vast ecosystem of private interests through collusion between companies and former high-ranking officials, creating an unfair market where ordinary citizens and small and medium-sized enterprises cannot even access this privileged class.

A representative figure is Han Duck-soo. He is a typical example of a "Mofia" (finance and financial official) who served as Minister of Strategy and Finance (formerly the Ministry of Finance and Economy) and Prime Minister, and then worked as an advisor at Korea's largest law firm (Kim & Chang). Han Duck-soo exerted influence on policy decisions as a high-ranking official, and after retirement, he followed a typical path of according preferential treatment to former officials by entering the private sector, such as large corporations and law firms, and utilizing his personal connections and information. In fact, he is often mentioned as a symbolic figure of an "invisible power exchange" connecting the government, business world, and law firms.

Korea's chaebol system and the jeon-gwan ye-u (former government official preferential treatment) culture form a complementary relationship. Chaebol companies increase predictability regarding government policies by recruiting former high-ranking public officials, and gain an advantageous position in regulatory evasion or preferential treatment acquisition. Conversely, high-ranking public officials enter into a tacit agreement to secure a comfortable position after retirement by pursuing chaebol-friendly policies during their tenure. This results in a serious undermining of fair market economy and democratic decision-making processes. What is particularly problematic is that this practice continues regardless of changes in government. Whether under a conservative or progressive regime, the post-retirement behavior of high-ranking public officials does not change significantly. This means that jeon-gwan ye-u has become a structural characteristic of Korean society, going beyond simple political patronage.

The system of according preferential treatment to former judges and prosecutors operates as a major driving force behind deepening social inequality. The networks formed by former high-ranking public officials are exclusive and closed, placing ordinary citizens and small and medium-sized enterprises that do not belong to these networks in a structurally disadvantaged position. In legal disputes, the outcome between a company that can hire a legal team including a former prosecutor and one that cannot is as good as decided. Furthermore, this system makes young people perceive public office as an 'investment'. The reality that a significant number of civil service exam candidates choose public office with future transfer to the private sector in mind, rather than the ideal of public service, undermines the ethical foundation of the public sector.

In this way, preferential treatment for former judges and prosecutors goes beyond simple employment connections or career utilization, leading to serious inequality and distrust throughout society through the close relationship between power and capital. In a democratic society, public office should be a place for public service for the people, but in Korea, public office is recognized as a kind of 'ladder' and is used as a means to maximize private interests thereafter. Furthermore, this phenomenon fundamentally undermines public trust in the government. If public officials are likely to act with their post-retirement plans in mind even while in office, questions arise as to whether their policy decisions are truly for the public good. This is a structural problem stemming from the lack of institutional mechanisms and ethical responsibility to ensure that public officials dedicate themselves to the public good, not personal gain.

Therefore, along with strengthening regulations on the post-employment activities of former high-ranking officials, it is essential to establish legal and institutional mechanisms to prevent the private use of networks built during their tenure in public office. Beyond simply extending the employment restriction period, lobbying activities of former high-ranking officials should be transparent, and the obligation to disclose cases or policies in which they were involved should be strengthened. A cultural reform within the public sector is also necessary. To create an environment where public officials can work solely for the public good without considering their post-retirement prospects, the social status and compensation system of public office itself must be reviewed. A change in social perception is also needed so that public office can be recognized as a valuable career in itself, rather than a stepping stone to the private sector. It is time to recognize that preferential treatment for former judges and prosecutors is not just an employment benefit, but leads to a larger social problem of privatization of power and unfair accumulation of wealth. If Korean society is to realize true democracy and a fair market economy, dismantling this chronic power-capital collusion structure has become the most urgent task.