단상斷想

Lee Jae-myung, the leader of the Democratic Party of Korea, recently proposed a 'Prime Minister nomination by the National Assembly' as part of his constitutional amendment plan, which is causing considerable repercussions in the Korean political landscape. Debate is actively unfolding across the political sphere, academia, and civil society as to whether this statement is a simple measure for decentralizing power, or a strategic move towards a cabinet system or a decentralized presidential system. At the heart of this debate lies a complex entanglement of historical, political, and social contexts regarding the restructuring of Korea's power structure, which carries profound implications that go beyond simple institutional changes.

Looking at the main contents of the constitutional amendment plan proposed by Representative Lee Jae-myung, it includes the introduction of a 4-year presidential term, the introduction of a presidential runoff vote system, the transfer of the Board of Audit and Inspection to the National Assembly, the mandatory approval of the National Assembly for the president's emergency orders and declaration of martial law, restrictions on the president's veto power, appointment of the prime minister through National Assembly recommendation, mandatory National Assembly consent for the appointment of heads of neutral organizations, and strengthening of local autonomy and basic rights. Representative Lee argues that this direction of constitutional amendment is an attempt to build a more balanced democratic system by strengthening the president's accountability while dispersing power. In particular, he emphasizes that the recommendation of the National Assembly should be introduced as an essential procedure for the appointment of the Prime Minister, and explains that this will allow checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches to operate more effectively.

However, strong criticisms and concerns are being raised about these proposals from some in the political sphere and constitutional scholars. They point out that the method of the National Assembly recommending the Prime Minister and the President appointing them corresponds to the core elements of a typical cabinet system or semi-presidential system (anti-presidential system). Substantially transferring the power to appoint the Prime Minister, which was considered the President's inherent authority, to the National Assembly is a significant change that weakens the essence of the presidential system, and it can be interpreted as a preliminary groundwork for a shift to a cabinet system in the long term. Furthermore, the proposals to transfer the Board of Audit and Inspection to the National Assembly, limit the President's veto power, and require the National Assembly's consent when appointing heads of neutral organizations are all designed to reduce the President's authority and expand the National Assembly's influence. From this perspective, it is argued that this is not a simple decentralization of power but a pursuit of a fundamental change in the power structure.

In response, Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party refute that this constitutional revision plan aims to introduce a cabinet system. Instead, they say it is a plan to reduce the harm caused by excessive concentration of power while maintaining the basic framework of the current presidential system. They argue that introducing a four-year presidential term with a runoff voting system will rather strengthen the president's democratic legitimacy and accountability. They also state that expanding the power of the National Assembly is an essential measure to build a democratic system faithful to the principle of checks and balances. They argue that the National Assembly's recommendation of the Prime Minister is an institutional mechanism that can enhance the efficiency and stability of state administration and promote communication and cooperation between the executive and legislative branches.

However, to understand this debate, it is necessary to deeply examine the historical perception and public sentiment towards the parliamentary system in Korean society. In the political history of Korea, the discussion of the parliamentary system goes beyond a simple issue of institutional choice and is closely linked to the historical experiences of the Japanese colonial period and the post-liberation era. The historical memory that pro-Japanese forces and vested interests attempted to introduce a parliamentary system to maintain their political influence immediately after liberation has formed a strong distrust and resistance to the parliamentary system. The negative frame of 'remnants of pro-Japanese' repeatedly appearing with the discussion of the parliamentary system originates from this historical context. Furthermore, Korean political culture has deep roots in the preference for strong leaders and the principle of direct democratic control. For people who are accustomed to the president directly elected by the people exercising strong leadership to run state affairs, a parliamentary system in which the influence of political parties and the National Assembly is strengthened may be perceived as a retreat of democracy. In particular, in a reality where public trust in the National Assembly and political parties is relatively low, there is widespread concern that the introduction of a parliamentary system will weaken the people's political choices and deepen the power monopoly of political elites.

Distrust related to the hereditary nature of politics also acts as a major obstacle to discussions about the cabinet system. In Korean society, the phenomenon of politicians passing on their positions and influence to family members or close aides has been the subject of criticism. Under a cabinet system, the dynamics within political parties and the majority party in the National Assembly have a decisive influence on the composition of the executive branch, which could further increase the possibility of specific political families or factions monopolizing power in the long term. This can act as an element that undermines the basic principles of democracy, such as the circulation and diversity of power, and carries the risk of weakening the political representation and participation of the people.

Furthermore, the lack of national consensus becomes prominent whenever discussions about a cabinet system are repeatedly raised. In Korean society, where political polarization is deepening, it is a very difficult task to draw social consensus on fundamental changes such as the reorganization of the power structure. In a situation where experts' opinions on the cabinet system or a decentralized presidential system do not agree, attempts to amend the constitution without sufficient social discussion and national consent are likely to deepen political conflict and division. This can lead to the opposite result of strengthening democracy and political development, which is the original purpose of constitutional amendment.

Another problem inherent in Representative Lee Jae-myung's constitutional amendment plan is the discrepancy between intention and outcome that arises in the context of real politics. Theoretically, a constitutional amendment aimed at strengthening the separation of powers and checks and balances could be distorted in actual political reality depending on the ruling party's power grab or political interests. In particular, considering the historical background of Korean party politics, which has been formed around people and regions rather than ideology or policy, there is a risk that institutional changes may not achieve the intended effect and may rather lead to political confusion and instability.

Moreover, in order for a constitutional amendment that strengthens the role of the National Assembly and political parties to function effectively, the accountability and transparency of the National Assembly, and the democratic operation of political parties must be prerequisites. However, the current political party system in Korea still has closed and undemocratic elements, and public trust in the activities of the National Assembly is very low. In this environment, a constitutional amendment that only strengthens the powers of the National Assembly may rather weaken political accountability and deepen public distrust of politics.

There is also a lack of empirical analysis on what effects the introduction of cabinet system elements, such as the Prime Minister's recommendation system by the National Assembly, would realistically have. Pushing for significant institutional changes based solely on theoretical justification, without case studies from countries with similar political cultures and historical backgrounds to Korea, or analysis of institutional effects based on empirical data, can be risky. In particular, fundamental changes such as power structure reorganization should comprehensively consider whether they can contribute to long-term national development and democratic consolidation, rather than temporary political interests or ideological orientations.

In conclusion, Lee Jae-myung's remark about 'Prime Minister's recommendation by the National Assembly' can be interpreted as an element of a semi-presidential system that aims to strengthen democracy through decentralization of power while maintaining the basic framework of the presidential system on the surface. However, considering the cabinet system-like nature of this proposal and the historical perception and public sentiment toward the cabinet system in Korean society, criticism that it is a prelude to the transition to a cabinet system is inevitable. In particular, in a situation where the public has strong distrust and antipathy towards the cabinet system for various reasons such as pro-Japanese remnants, political inheritance, and weakening of the people's political choice, any attempt to amend the constitution without sufficient social discussion and public consensus is highly likely to deepen political conflict and distrust, regardless of its intention.

Therefore, in order for Representative Lee Jae-myung's constitutional amendment plan to contribute to genuine democratic development and strengthening national competitiveness, a comprehensive approach is needed that encompasses reforms to the entire political system, including the democratic operation of political parties and the National Assembly, expansion of political representation, and revitalization of citizen participation, going beyond simple changes in the power structure. Also, in the process of constitutional amendment discussions, an attitude that prioritizes national consensus and social dialogue over political interests is required. Ultimately, the judgment on what power structure is most suitable for Korean society should be made through broad participation and discussion of the entire nation, comprehensively considering historical experience and realistic conditions.